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ABSTRACT 
Since the signing of peace treaties in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1992 and 
1996 respectively, both countries have experienced exploding levels of crime and 
violence as a result of gangs, drug trafficking organizations, and organized crime. 
Because both nations share many common traits, a general perception is that the causes 
and effects of criminal activity are similar in both countries. The patterns, causes, and 
effects of criminal activity, however, vary significantly between El Salvador and 
Guatemala.  Specifically, organized crime—with its hallmarks of violence, corruption, 
and penetration of state institutions—is a problem that afflicts Guatemala much more 
than in El Salvador.  Security sector reforms and the demilitarization of security forces in 
El Salvador prevented organized crime from gaining hold over time whereas police 
reform in Guatemala failed to purge the security apparatus of former militarized forces 
with ties to organized crime.  A strong political party system in El Salvador acts as a 
gatekeeper in preventing many organized crime elements from penetrating the state while 
a weak party system in Guatemala allowed for much greater infiltration of illicit entities.  
Future policy regarding both countries should give greater attention to organized crime 
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Since the signing of peace treaties in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1992 and 
1996 respectively, both countries have experienced exploding levels of crime and 
violence as a result of gangs, drug trafficking organizations, and organized crime.  Since 
1999, homicide rates in Guatemala have increased more than 120% to a rate of 47 per 
100,000 inhabitants, as reported in 2006.1  As of 2005, El Salvador had a reported 
homicide rate of 59 per 100,000 inhabitants.2  By this measure, El Salvador and 
Guatemala rank as the fifth and sixth most violent nations in the world, respectively.  The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cites Guatemala and El Salvador 
as the worst affected countries in Central America with respect to gang activity and 
related violence, with a reported 14,000 and 10,500 gang members respectively.3  Both 
are part of the “Central American corridor” through which an estimated 90% of the 
cocaine that enters the United States passes. 
When discussing the nature, causes, and consequences of criminal activity in El 
Salvador and Guatemala, most analysts tend to stress the similarities between the two 
nations.  In its “crime diagnostic” of Central America, the UNODC argues that El 
Salvador and Guatemala both suffer from extraordinarily high homicide rates, intense 
exposure to the drug trade, high levels of gang activity, and corruption linked to 
organized crime.4  The similarity in crime problems is attributed to the many 
characteristics the two countries have in common.  They share a common border, have 
endured years of civil war, and have made a transition to democracy within the last two 
decades.  Both are geographically located in a region that is used as a vital transit stop for 
the transportation of illicit narcotics to the United States from the largest drug-producing 
                                                 
1 World Health Organization, "Statistical report on violence in Guatemala," December 2007. 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/national_activities/gtm/en/index.html (accessed 
December 03, 2008). 
2 Overseas Security Advisory Council, "San Salvador, El Salvador: 2006 Crime and Safety Report," 
April 19, 2006. http://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=45275 (accessed December 03, 2008). 
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Report, “Crime and Development in Central 
America: Caught in the Crossfire,” May 2007, 16–17. 
4 Ibid., 15–18. 
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region in the world, the Andean Ridge.  The transitions to democracy have been difficult 
for both nations as each had to contend with the social conditions created by years of 
internal conflict and burgeoning poverty.  Military downsizing and processes of police 
reform carried out in accordance with the peace treaties that ended the internal conflict 
are said to have created security vacuums that criminals could exploit.  The inability of 
each state to respond to these conditions has created a situation in which high levels of 
impunity and increased violence have become the norm. 
Despite this conventional wisdom, the evidence available suggests that the 
patterns of criminal activity in El Salvador and Guatemala are significantly different: as a 
result, the causes are not always the same, or at best undetermined; and the capacity of 
the state to respond to these threats vary in important ways.  This proposed thesis will 
explore the similarities and differences between the two countries by addressing the 
following questions:  What are the origins, evolution, and nature of the threat posed by 
gangs, drug trafficking organizations, and organized crime in El Salvador and 
Guatemala?  How can these varying patterns be explained?  What are the implications for 
the ability of the government to fight violent crime?   
A. IMPORTANCE 
The security threat posed by gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime in 
Central America are of great concern for the United States given the deep social and 
economic links with Latin America.5  Because gangs in El Salvador and Guatemala have 
ties to gangs in the United States, it is important to determine the extent to which they 
pose a threat to U.S. national security.  El Salvador and Guatemala are regarded as transit 
countries for the transportation of illegal narcotics.6  The geographic location of these 
two countries with respect to the United States make for ideal stop over points for 
narcotics en route from coca producing regions in the Andean Ridge.  Essentially, 
                                                 
5 U.S. Southern Command, “2008 Posture Statement Before the 110th Congress,” 2008, 7.  
6 U.S. Department of State, "Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement Country Program: El Salvador,” 
June 30, 2005. http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/48915.htm (accessed May 18, 2008); and U.S. Department 
of State, "Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement Country Program: Guatemala," August 16, 2005. 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/51347.htm (accessed May 18, 2008). 
 3
Guatemala and El Salvador, like the rest of Central America, are “trapped between the 
world’s biggest suppliers and consumers of cocaine.”7  The flow of drugs through both 
countries, coupled with burgeoning poverty and government corruption, provide an 
environment in both countries to allow for the proliferation of intense illegal activity and 
violence.   
The promotion of democracy is a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy.  Corruption 
and violence resulting from prolific organized criminal activities undermine the 
commitment of citizens in these countries to the democratic process and greatly impede 
the process of social and economic development essential for stability.8  Aside from the 
impediment to the sustainment of democracy, the economic toll of the crime and violence 
is great.  In 2005, the Salvadoran Public Security Council estimated that the cost of 
combating crime and violence by governments in Central America was 6.5 billion USD, 
or almost 7.7% of the region’s total gross domestic product (GDP).  Guatemala and El 
Salvador led the region by spending 2.29 and 2.1 billion USD respectively.9  These 
numbers only represent the cost of the governments’ response to crime and violence.  
Other reports estimate that annual physical costs of violence–trauma to victims and health 
expenditures–cost El Salvador 1.7 billion USD (11.5% GDP) and Guatemala 2.4 billion 
USD (7.3% GDP) in recent years.10 
In order to respond effectively to the security threats posed by various criminal 
and violent activities, an accurate assessment of the true nature and level of each threat is 
warranted. While an improved criminal justice system would help with any kind of 
crime, resources are limited and need to be applied to address the most important 
problems.  Gangs require different responses than organized crime that has infiltrated the 
government; prevention and rehabilitation of gang members would be appropriate for the 
                                                 
7 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 9. 
8 USAID, "USAID Promotes The Rule Of Law In Latin America And Caribbean Democracies," 
March 31, 2005. http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/democracy/rule/index.html 
(accessed November 22, 2008). 
9 Southern Pulse Network Staff, "The Price of Crime and Violence in Central America," August 25, 
2008. http://mexidata.info/id1949.html (accessed December 03, 2008). 
10 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 74. 
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former whereas anti-corruption measures are vital for the latter.  Similarly, the two 
problems create different political challenges in crafting effective responses.  For 
example, with gangs the challenge often is to avoid the demonization of gang members 
and craft a response that is not purely a hard line approach.  In the case of organized 
crime, the challenge is often the opposite: generating the political will to adopt a stricter 
response to actors who have cultivated ties with corrupt officials.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most analyses of crime and violence in Guatemala and El Salvador tend to group 
the two countries together, asserting that they suffer from similar problems because of 
their shared characteristics.  The UNODC’s 2007 report offers a good overview of this 
argument.  The two face similar problems as outlined in the “crime diagnostics” of 
homicides, drugs, gangs, and corruption.  Additionally, similar reasons for crime and 
violence are explored under “points of vulnerability”: geography, underdevelopment, low 
criminal justice capacity, and a history of conflict.  The latter factor includes a culture of 
violence, the proliferation of small arms, a culture of corruption, authoritarian and 
militarized policing, and deportation as key causes of crime in both countries. 11    
It is commonly noted that, “Guatemala and El Salvador are internationally among 
the most violent countries for which standardized data has been collected.”12  Most of the 
gang activity in Central America takes place in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, 
with the focus of analysis and data available tending to concern mostly Guatemala and El 
Salvador. 13  Data on gangs in both countries focuses on two main gangs: Mara 
Salvatrucha, or MS–13 (predominantly in El Salvador), and Barrio 18, or the 18th Street 
Gang (predominant in Guatemala).  Recently, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
has expressed concern with the development of these two gangs into transnational 
organizations.14 There are increasing reports that deported MS–13 gang members return 
                                                 
11 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 11–24. 
12 Clare Ribando Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” CRS Report for Congress, March 27, 2008. 2. 
13 Ibid., 8. 
14 Celinda Franco. “The MS–13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats?” CRS 
Report for Congress, January 30, 2008. 
 5
to the United States illegally, via Guatemala and Mexico, and often with new recruits, 
and that money procured by gang activity in the United States was frequently sent back to 
El Salvador to aide gang members on the streets and in prison.15  
Both countries are considered transit countries for the importation of illegal 
narcotics en route to the United States from the Andes.  UNODC reports that: “every 
Central American country seized at least a ton of cocaine in 2004.”16  Correlations are 
also drawn between drug trafficking and its impact on other criminal activities.  
According to UNODC, “perhaps the most damaging impact drug trafficking has had on 
the region is the fostering of corruption” and that corruption is “a regular feature of life in 
many Central American countries.”17 The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) 
reported how corrupt elements within the political structure in Guatemala and El 
Salvador “merge with organized criminal networks and, through their activities, aim to 
undermine the functioning of legitimate state institutions in order to avoid accountability 
for past and current crimes and guarantee their continued ability to operate freely.”18 
The tendency to view the crime and corruption problems in El Salvador and 
Guatemala as comparable is also evident in the growing number of analyses that lump the 
problem of gangs, drug trafficking organizations and the political-criminal nexus together 
under the vague label of “transnational organized crime.”19  Gangs themselves have 
increasingly been labeled as transnational criminal organizations and it has been argued 
that gangs are linked to other forms of organized crime.20  The transnational organized 
crime label may be accurate if one uses a minimalist definition of organized crime “as 
any group having a formalized structure whose primary objective is to obtain money 
                                                 
15 Richard J. Lopez, Rich Connell, and Chris Kraul, "Gang Uses Deportation to Its Advantage to 
Flourish in U.S.," October 30, 2005. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-me-gang30oct30, 
1,4836173.story?page=2&coll=la-util-nationworld-world (accessed June 17, 2008). 
16 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 15. 
17 Ibid., 17–18. 
18 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) Special Report. “The Captive State: Organized 
Crime and Human Rights in Latin America,” October 2007. 2. 
19 On the lack of agreement over definitions of organized crime see Jeanne Giraldo and Harold 
Trinkunas. 
20 Franco, “The MS–13,” 6. 
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through illegal activities.”21  However, when policymakers and law enforcement officials 
invoke the term, they most often are concerned with the features of organized crime that 
do not appear in this definition: high levels of violence and corruption, penetration of the 
licit economy, and the increasing sophistication of the organizations.22 A central 
argument of this thesis is that these features do not characterize gangs nor are they 
present at comparable levels in the two countries under study.   
The proliferation of crime and violence in Guatemala and El Salvador has been 
attributed to several characteristics that the two countries share.  These include the 
prevalent culture of violence, the availability of weapons, poverty and inequality, and 
corruption.23  Other factors include the inability of the state to reform its security sector 
following the peace accords, as well as U.S. deportation policy. 
The legacy of internal conflict is said to contribute to current high levels of 
violent crime in a number of ways.  Years of conflict can have profound psychological 
effects on a populace in that “violence may become normalized.”24  Additionally, the 
availability of small arms in post-conflict societies also contributes to violence.  In 2000, 
both countries ranked the highest in Central America in numbers of legally registered 
firearms, with over 145,000 in Guatemala and 170,000 in El Salvador.25  In addition, 
UNODC cites a recent survey estimating that there are at least 450,000 small arms in El 
Salvador, enough to arm one in every fourth person, with an estimated 60% procured 
illegally.26  The U.N. Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) estimated in 2002 that there 
were “1.8 million illegal firearms in circulation” in that country.27   
Underdevelopment is also identified as a key cause of crime in the two countries. 
Inequality, in particular, has been identified as a contributor to crime in statistical, cross-
                                                 
21 Franco, “The MS–13,” 6. 
22 Giraldo and Trinkunas. 
23 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 25–43. 
24 Ibid., 36. 
25 Ibid., 67 (Figure 56). 
26 Ibid., 68. 
27 Ibid. 
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national studies.  El Salvador and Guatemala are ranked with a Gini inequality index of 
55 and 52, respectively.  Only eighteen countries worldwide have a score of 52 or higher, 
four of which are in Central America.28   
Corruption only adds to the proliferation of crime and violence.  Corrupt state 
officials, at every level, undermine the rule of law, “manipulate state institutions and, at 
times, achieve near-total control of the political system to guarantee their power, advance 
and protect their illegal activities and ensure their protection from the law.”29  Further, 
“drugs are a key driver of corruption in transit areas, starting among the border and law 
enforcement officials but potentially reaching even the highest levels.”30    
The literature on police reform in Central America, and on security sector reform 
more generally in post-conflict countries, stresses the security vacuum and increased 
threat to public security that is often created by the process of demilitarization and reform 
mandated by peace treaties.31  Additionally, literature shows that when demilitarization 
did not produce effective results immediately, the state resorted to utilizing the military in 
lieu of the police for public security.  Edgardo Amaya notes that as El Salvador made the 
transition to democracy, the security apparatus had not transitioned completely from a 
counterinsurgency approach to one more conducive to a democratic regime.32  Marie-
                                                 
28 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 27. 
29 WOLA, “The Captive State,” 2. 
30 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 70. 
31 Charles T. Call, “Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of Law in El 
Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies 35, No. 4 (November 2003): 827–62; Chuck Call, “Police 
Reform, Human Rights, and Democratization in Post-conflict Settings: Lessons from El Salvador,” in 
USAID Conference: Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and Reintegration in Post-conflict Societies. 
October 30–31, 1997; Orlando J. Pérez, “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and 
Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala,” Political Science Quarterly 118, No. 4 (Winter 2003–04): 627–
44; William Stanley, “Building New Police Forces in El Salvador and Guatemala: Learning and Counter-
Learning,” in Peacebuilding and Police Reform, ed. Tor Tanke Holm and Espen Barth Eide (Portland, OR: 
Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.).  
32 Edgardo A. Amaya, “Security Policies in El Salvador, 1992–2002,” in Public Security and Police 
Reform in the Americas, ed. John Baily and Lucia Dammert (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2006). 
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Louise Glebbeek asserts that the military in Guatemala was often called upon to fulfill 
police functions in light of rising crime immediately following the peace accords.33   
Finally, the literature on the origins and proliferation of gangs and gang activity in 
both countries provide evidence that U.S. deportation policy may indeed be a major 
contributor to the increase in gang activity in both El Salvador and Guatemala.  
Deportations of illegal immigrants rose since the passage of the 1996 Illegal Immigrant 
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and in 2006 it was reported that 
over 10,000 Salvadorans and over 18,000 Guatemalans, many with criminal records, 
were deported in that year alone.34   
In sum, much of the literature paints the comparison between Guatemala and El 
Salvador with broad strokes.  The two are seen as suffering from similar levels of crime, 
violence and corruption, caused by shared histories of civil war, inequality, deportations 
and inadequate police reform.  This thesis, instead, argues that the two differ in important 
ways in the criminal threats they face and sets out to understand what factors can explain 
these differences. 
C. ARGUMENTS AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this thesis argues that patterns of criminal 
activity in El Salvador and Guatemala differ in significant ways.  For example, evidence 
shows that gang activity is far more prevalent in El Salvador than in Guatemala.   
Drug seizure data and an examination of historical trafficking routes show that 
drug trafficking activity is far more prevalent in Guatemala than El Salvador. Guatemala 
has long been on the U.S. list of “Major Drug Transit” countries (along with Panama, 
Mexico, and the Dominican Republic) but El Salvador has never appeared on this list,  
 
                                                 
33 Maria-Louise Gleebbek, “Police Reform and the Peace Process in Guatemala: The Fifth Promotion 
of the National Civilian Police,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 20, No. 4 (2001): 439. 
34 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 6–7. 
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being referred to as simply a “transit country.”35 Most significantly, for the purposes of 
this thesis, organized crime and corruption seems to be far more evident in Guatemala 
than El Salvador. 
Chapter II documents these differences and argues that the threat posed by 
organized crime and corruption to democratic stability and to U.S. security is far great 
than the threat posed by gangs.  It challenges commonly held beliefs that gangs are 
heavily involved in the drug trade36 and are evolving into a transnational criminal threat 
with ties to other organized crime.37  Instead, it calls for greater attention to the threat 
posed by organized crime in Guatemala.  The rest of the thesis then sets out to understand 
the reasons for the higher levels of organized crime in Guatemala, despite the many 
characteristics the two countries have in common.  Isolating the factors responsible for El 
Salvador’s relative ability to resist organized crime and corruption may provide some 
leverage for policymakers to combat organized crime in Guatemala and to fortify El 
Salvador against this threat in the future.  
Chapter III argues that one of the reasons for the greater infiltration of organized 
crime in Guatemala’s security sector can be traced to differences in Guatemala’s and El 
Salvador’s conflict and post-conflict experiences.  During the period of internal conflict, 
the military regime in Guatemala relied more than the Salvadoran military on drugs and 
illicit activity to fund counterinsurgency activities.38  After the war, the process of police 
reform in Guatemala fell far short of the transformation carried out in El Salvador. 39  As 
a result, ties between the security sector and illicit actors in Guatemala remained much 
stronger.   
                                                 
35 U.S. Department of State, "Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement Country Program: El Salvador,” 
June 30, 2005. http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/48915.htm (accessed May 18, 2008).  
36 Shifter, Michael. "Latin America's Drug Problem." Current History 106, no. 697 (February 2007): 
62. 
37 Franco, 2008. 
38 Nazih Richani, “Systems of Violence and their Political Economy in Post-Conflict Situations,” 
Work in progress—Kean University, March 2007.  
39 William Stanley, “Building New Police Forces in El Salvador and Guatemala:  Learning and 
Counter-Learning,” in Peacebuilding and Police Reform, ed. Tor Tanke Holm and Espen Barth Eide.  
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In addition, as Chapter IV will show, differences in political party development 
during the internal conflicts can help explain difference in the political-criminal nexus in 
recent years.  In El Salvador internal transformation of the rightist party (ARENA) 
caused a clean break from the past as business oriented politicians took over from 
traditional agrarian elites who had ties with paramilitary death squads and other criminal 
networks from the authoritarian period.40  In Guatemala, in contrast, these similar ties 
have persisted into the democratic period, fueling corruption and organized crime and 
undermining efforts to carry out security sector reform. More generally, the weakness of 
parties in Guatemala leaves the political system open to penetration by organized crime; 
weak parties also deprive governments of the backing necessary to take on these “hidden 
powers.”   
Finally, Chapter V will summarize the key points presented herein as well as 
provide basic recommendations to approaching policy regarding crime and violence in 
both countries. To date, too much emphasis, in the media as well as by many 
policymakers, has been placed on the threats of gangs and drug traffickers.  A shift in 
policy attention from these usual suspects to organized crime, as well as a renewed focus 
on the political party systems in place in both nations may be well warranted, based on 




                                                 
40 Elizabeth Jean Wood, “Challenges to Political Democracy in El Salvador,” in The Third Wave of 
Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, ed. Frances Hagopian and Scott P. 
Mainwaring (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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II. THE NATURE AND STATE OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE: 
GANGS, DRUGS, AND ORGANIZED CRIME 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines three specific aspects of illegal activity in both El Salvador 
and Guatemala: gangs, drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and organized crime.  It 
shows that while gangs and drug trafficking pose the most serious threats in the form of 
crime and violence, their level and effects vary between El Salvador and Guatemala.  
While a trend of increasing criminal activity is evident in both countries, the levels and 
significance of these increases is not universal to both nations.  Specifically, gang activity 
and gang violence appears to be far more prevalent in El Salvador than in Guatemala. In 
addition, the chapter shows that the data available does not support the common assertion 
that youth gangs are highly involved in drug trafficking that the gangs examined are 
becoming a transnational threat to the United States.  With respect to drug trafficking, 
this chapter will display that there is far more activity and violence attributed to DTOs in 
Guatemala than in El Salvador.   
The second purpose of this chapter is to differentiate both gangs and DTOs from 
organized crime. While the former can sometimes display characteristics of organized 
crime, they must, for the overall purposes of this thesis, remain separate.  Organized 
crime entities, at times, may utilize both gangs and drug trafficking organizations, but 
their involvement with these groups is neither permanent, nor even required.  Instead, 
organized crime is characterized by its heavy reliance on violence and corruption, which 
are particularly damaging to democratic institutions.  In fact, the chapter argues that 
organized crime poses more of a threat to democratic stability than the much-discussed 
gangs.  It also shows that the threat from organized crime is much greater in Guatemala 
than El Salvador, a phenomenon that subsequent chapters attempt to explain. 
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B. DEFINITIONS 
Despite a proliferation of data and commentary on the issue there seems to be no 
definitive description of what constitutes a “gang” in the context of criminal activity.  As 
such, there are varying definitions of this term among scholars and governmental 
agencies.  The UNODC states that “a distinction needs to be made between criminal 
associations and true institutionalized gangs.”41  However, a recent report from the CRS 
asserts that: “gangs are generally considered to be distinct from organized criminal 
organizations because they lack the hierarchical leadership structure, capital, and 
manpower.”42   
Another CRS report on gang threats states that gangs fall into three categories.  
First-generation gangs are those that could commonly be called traditional; they are turf-
oriented, localized, lacking sophistication, have a loose power structure and engage is 
small criminal activity.  Second-generation gangs are more sophisticated, market-oriented 
rather than turf-oriented, and engage in criminal activities over a broader area, typically 
in the local drug trade.43 Third-generation gangs are those whose criminal activities 
transcend national borders.44  Gangs usually have a name and a distinct sense of identity.  
Additionally they usually employ unique outward reflections of their identity, such as 
tattoos, specific clothing, hand signs, or graffiti.  Gang membership in Latin America is 
typically composed of members between the ages of 12 and 24, but may also contain 
members much older.45  The term mara is often associated with Latin American gangs.  
The word is based most likely from the Salvadoran slang word marabunta, referring to a 
plague of fierce ants that devours anything in its path.46  In the context of this paper, 
gangs, or maras, will refer to any organization that fits the descriptions previously 
offered. 
                                                 
41 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 57–58. 
42 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 2. 
43 Note:  The operable word here being “local,” as will be examined in this paper. 
44 Franco, “The MS–13,” 4–5. 
45 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 1. 
46 Shifter, “Latin America's Drug Problem,” 62. 
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Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are far more readily defined and herein 
refer to any organized and structured enterprise that concerns itself with the production 
and transnational transportation of illegal narcotics.  This paper will limit the scope of 
DTOs to only those that utilize Guatemala and El Salvador as transit stopover points for 
the transportation of drugs to the United States.    
Of the three types of criminal activity examined, organized crime is the most 
difficult to define.  To reiterate from the previous chapter, what policymakers and law 
enforcement officials are concerned with when it comes to organized crime are the high 
levels of violence and corruption, a penetration of the licit economy, and the high degree 
of sophistication of the organizations.47  For the purposes of this thesis, it is these features 
of organized crime are key. Drug trafficking and gangs would only qualify as organized 
crime if they exhibit the aforementioned traits of violence, corruption, a high degree of 
sophistication, and penetration of the licit economy. 
C. GANGS 
Street gangs have existed in Central America for some time in one form or 
another, but evidence shows that these gangs have evolved since the early 1990s.  With 
respect to the negative aspects of gang proliferation, El Salvador and Guatemala are 
among the worst affected in Central America.48  Of the numerous gangs in Central 
America, there are two that stand out as a major concern for the United States.  CRS 
reports that: 
The major gangs operating in Central America with ties to the United 
States are the “18th Street” gang (also known as M–18) and their main 
rival, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS–13).49 
The social and economic disparity inherent in El Salvador and Guatemala are 
cited as facilitating factors in gang proliferation.  Poverty and a lack of educational and 
                                                 
47 Giraldo and Trinkunas, forthcoming.  
48 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 16. 
49 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 3. 
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job opportunities help to encourage new member recruitment while the societal stigma 
against gang members serves to prevent members from leaving.50  
1. Gang Origins in El Salvador and Guatemala 
The exact origin of gangs in both countries are not always agreed upon but the 
most frequently cited explanations are the violence of the civil wars in both countries 
during the 1970s and 1980s and U.S. immigration policy of the 1990s.  Before 
continuing, it is important to note, however, that most of the evidence available regards 
MS–13 and its origins with respect to El Salvador, with little information presented on 
other named gangs.  Additionally, analysis and commentary on gang activity in 
Guatemala is significantly lacking.    
Regarding MS–13, the civil war in El Salvador had displaced hundreds of 
thousands of people who sought refuge from the violence in the United States, many of 
whom settled in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods in Southern California.51  CRS 
reports that: 
By the end of the 1980s, some estimates indicate that more than 300,000 
Salvadorans had settled in Los Angeles.  One hypothesis on the gang 
formation asserts that Salvadoran immigrants during this period banned 
together and formed the MS–13 gang.52 
The report continues with: 
MS–13’s early membership is reported to have included former guerillas 
and Salvadoran government soldiers whose combat experience during the 
Salvadoran civil war contributed to the gang’s notoriety as one of the more 
brutal and violent Los Angeles street gangs.53   
In 1996, the United States government passed the Illegal Immigrant Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility (IIRIRA).  Deportations of illegal immigrants rose with the 
                                                 
50 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 5. 
51 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 16. 
52 Franco, “The MS–13,” 3–4. 
53 Ibid., 4. 
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passage of this act; it was reported that over 10,000 Salvadorans, many with criminal 
records, were deported in 2006 alone.54  But 1996 was not the beginning of this trend.  
There is evidence that the problem goes as far back as 1993 with increased deportations 
of criminals to Central America.  In 1994, The New York Times (NYT) reported that a 
crackdown on illegal immigration, initiated in 1993, was beginning to show its effects in 
the changing nature of street gangs in El Salvador.  According the article, the brash and 
belligerent social attitude, as well as the distinct outward appearance (tattoos, clothing, 
and hand signs) of U.S.-based Latino gangs began to gain hold among the Salvadoran 
youth populace. 55   
Even though MS–13 is, as indicated by most analysis, a gang with  origins in the 
Salvadoran community in the United States, it is present, along with Barrio 18 (another 
term for the 18th Street Gang),  in Guatemala as well.  The most recent United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) assessment on gangs in Central America 
states that MS–13 comprises approximately 80%of total gang members in Guatemala, 
with Barrio 18 representing 15%, and the remaining 5% composed of smaller gangs.56  
However, as will be explained in the following section, these numbers may be 
misleading.  This same assessment also indicates that the U.S. deportation policy 
previously described is most likely responsible for the proliferation of Guatemalan gangs, 
but it also indicates that the gangs may have migrated cross-border from El Salvador.57  
Ultimately, however, it is important to note that there is a significant lack of reported 
information concerning the origins of gangs in Guatemala.   
2. Assessing the Gang Threat 
With respect to the numbers of gang members in each country, the recent report 
by UNODC does provide detailed information on gangs and violence, and also raises a 
                                                 
54 Franco, “The MS–13,” 6. 
55 Mike O'Conner, "A New U.S. Import in El Salvador: Street Gangs," July 3, 1994. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE4DF113CF930A35754C0A962958260&sec=&spon
=&pagewanted=all (accessed June 17, 2008). 
56 US AID, “Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, Annex 2: Guatemala,” April 2006, 6. 
57 Ibid., 5-6. 
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few questions.  According to UNODC, gang membership in 2007 was estimated at 
10,500 in El Salvador and 14,000 in Guatemala.58 This may seem significant but the 
numbers represent less than 1% (.14% and .11% respectively) of the population in each 
country.59  Additionally, the numbers bear further scrutiny.  UNODC examined the 
average number of members in each gang for each country and found some significant 
differences between the two.  In El Salvador, average gang membership was listed as 
2625, indicating that there were four main gangs present in the country, MS–13 
obviously being one of them.  Regarding Guatemala, UNODC reports that the average 
gang membership per gang was only 32 members, indicating that there were over 437 
separate gangs. 60  This number alone makes it difficult to validate the USAID assertion 
that 80% of gang members in Guatemala were part of MS–13.  The only plausible answer 
to this discrepancy is that gang members in Guatemala have only a loose affiliation 
among each other and utilize MS–13 as an “umbrella” gang.  UNODC describes gang 
umbrella bodies as “...more symbolic of historical relationships than demonstrative of 
present unity of leadership.”61  Simply stated, separate gangs may use a common name 
and leave any other affiliation amongst each other at that.   
Determining the extent to which gangs in El Salvador and Guatemala are 
responsible for the increased violence and criminal activity in the years since the end of 
civil war in Guatemala and El Salvador is difficult at best. In El Salvador, it is reported 
that gangs engage in several criminal activities such as “kidnapping; human trafficking; 
drug, auto, and weapons smuggling” and other activities such as extortion of residents 
and business, in which gangs in San Salvador demand that citizens pay “war taxes.”62 
The press and electronic media often attribute that violence and crime to gangs, even 
                                                 
58 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 60. 
59 CIA World fact Book, "El Salvador," May 14, 2009. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/print/es.html (accessed June 1, 2009); and CIA World Fact Book, "Guatemala," May 14, 
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60 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 60. 
61 Ibid., 59. 
62 Ibid., 4. and UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 16. 
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when other actors (like DTOs and organized crime) are just as likely culprits. 63 
Additionally, the basis for these assertions come mostly from police statistics and 
government officials in the countries themselves, and maybe inaccurate, or outright 
exaggerated.64  For example, the 2007 UNODC Report examined the crime data and their 
origins and found several unusual statistics.  With respect to homicide, UNODC states:  
In El Salvador, it is claimed that 60% of all intentional homicides are 
carried out by the maras, but again, the evidence for this conclusion is 
unclear.  According to the Fiscalía General, there were 3781 murders in 
2005, 60% of which is 2269.  If the country’s 10,500 gangsters were 
responsible for these, then about one in four killed another person that 
year.65 
That assertion does not seem credible.66  As for Guatemala, UNODC reports: 
Similarly, in Guatemala, a recent police study of the 427 murders that 
occurred in that country in January 2006 could only attribute 58 of these to 
gang activity (14%), 40 in urban areas and 18 in the countryside.67 
3. Gangs and Drug Activity 
In addition to questionable claims about gang responsibility for overall levels of 
violence, assertions about gang involvement in drug trafficking are also tenuous. A 2007 
Current History article stated that: 
El Salvador’s gangs are heavily involved in the drug trade, acting as 
enforcers and dealers within established distribution networks, creating 
their own inroads and supply chains, and using profits and addiction to 
recruit new members.68 
                                                 
63 Note: A recent search of media sources via the internet concerning gang activity in Guatemala and 
El Salvador revealed several articles with sensational headlines attributing violence and criminal activity to 
gangs.  However, a thorough examination of these reports indicates an almost ambiguous relationship 
between gangs in general and the crimes that have been attributed to them.     
64 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 3-4. 
65 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 61. 
66 Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” 4. 
67 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 61. 
68 Shifter, “Latin America's Drug Problem,” 62. 
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In fact, evidence suggests that gangs in El Salvador are more interested in buying 
the drugs for their own use rather than becoming involved in trafficking for a source of 
income.  UNODC reports that in 2006 a national drug survey indicated that only 
approximately 0.25% of the population, aged 15–64, used cocaine regularly, which is less 
than 10,000 persons in the entire country.  This number is less than the total number of 
estimated gang members in El Salvador, 69 indicating that the distribution and sale of 
cocaine is certainly not a lucrative prospect for the gang.  Additionally, UNODC reports 
that 43% of gang members in El Salvador are regular drug users, supporting the assertion 
that the gangs are dealing to themselves, rather than the population.70 
Regarding Guatemala, the information on gangs and their connections to drugs is 
significantly lacking, or at the very least highly ambiguous.  Confounding the issue are 
some U.S. government reports and media articles.  The USAID assessment for 
Guatemala states: 
The international drug trade is closely connected to gang activity in 
Guatemala.  Guatemala serves as a critical point of trans-shipment of 
drugs originating in Colombia and destined for United States markets, 
which has created thriving narco-trafficking and organized crime networks 
in the country.71 
USAID, however, offers no other data to support the assertion that the drug trade is 
“closely connected” to gangs.  In Current History, it is reported that: 
Large cocaine and heroin deliveries enter Guatemalan ports via speedboats 
and fishing vessels, then are broken down into smaller shipments and sent 
overland to the United States via Mexico.72 
Given that drugs enter the country via maritime ports, UNODC seems to refute this 
gang/drug trade assertion, stating: 
It is unclear how the bulk of youth gang members, who live far from the 
sea and are not known for their maritime skills, would add value to the 
                                                 
69 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 62. 
70 Ibid. 
71 US AID, “Central America,” 20. 
72 Shifter, “Latin America's Drug Problem,” 62. 
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process of moving drugs northward.  Even with regard to traffic along the 
Pan American Highway, it is unclear how mareros could assist.73 
News articles also perpetuate the myth of a strong link between gangs and drugs 
but, given the evidence currently available, there is reason to doubt that gangs in El 
Salvador and Guatemala are  significantly involved in the trafficking of illegal narcotics. 
4. Transnational Gangs 
Significant doubt can also be cast on recent claims that of Central American 
gangs have evolved into “third-generation” transnational organizations.74 In 2005 The 
Los Angeles Times, in an extensive exposé on MS–13, asserted that the gang, as a result 
of deportation policy, has increased its transnational activity.   According to the article, 
deported MS–13 gang members would return to the United States illegally, via 
Guatemala and Mexico, and often with new recruits.75  This article pointed to an increase 
in cross-border activities by gangs with affiliations transcending national borders.  
Additionally, a recent CRS report indicates that there is a concern within the U.S. 
government regarding the transnational nature of Central American gangs with US 
affiliations, specifically the 18th Street Gang and MS–13.   CRS reports that the FBI, 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) have all initiated aggressive investigations of violent third-generation 
transnational street gangs, specifically MS–13.76  However, at this time, the case for 
identifying gangs as truly “third generation” and transnational is not entirely made. CRS 
states that, “most researchers agree that the primary distinction between transnational 
gangs and other domestic street gangs is that transnational gangs are criminally active 
and operational in more than one country.”77  Ties between individuals in different 
countries, as presented in the Los Angeles Times exposé, does not indicate the level of 
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77 Ibid., 6. 
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sophistication and central control implied by the above characterization.  While MS–13 
and M–18, as noted by CRS, display some characteristics of “third generation” and 
transnational gangs, they do not exhibit the main characteristics of such gangs, which is 
“highly sophisticated, ‘mercenary-type group[s] with goals of power or financial 
acquisition and a set of fully evolved political aims.”78 
5. Summary: Gangs in El Salvador and Guatemala 
Gangs certainly pose a public security threat in El Salvador and Guatemala.  The 
majority of data, analysis, and commentary on gangs in Central America are reserved for 
El Salvador.  Of this, it is evident that gangs in El Salvador, particularly MS–13, have 
proliferated since the early 1990s and their activities, specifically small-time extortion, 
theft, and violence, are increasing.  The origins these gangs, specifically MS–13, seem to 
have roots in the gang culture imported from the United States, and there is strong 
evidence that U.S. immigration policy may in fact play a large role in both the origin and 
continued expansion of these criminal groups.  However, there is little evidence to 
support the assertion that gangs have evolved into transnational organizations and are 
deeply involved in drug trafficking.  The 2007 UNODC Report offers some useful insight 
on this issue: 
The relationship between street gangs, which start out as local and 
territorial, and trans-national organized crime can be difficult to discern.  
Clearly, where possible, it is to the advantage of both the gangs and 
transnational syndicates to form alliances.  Street gangs provide the ideal 
network for drug distribution or for sourcing stolen property…But street 
gangs often have their own issues to deal with, rooted in the fact that they 
are generally more than just income-generating ventures.  Street gangs are 
made up of young people associated by their residence in a particular 
location, and remain chiefly concerned about local issues, including 
matters of identity, turf, and respect.  This can cause them to act against 
their own economic interest, making them unpredictable partners for true 
professional criminals.79   
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D. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS 
El Salvador and Guatemala are both regarded by the U.S. government as transit 
countries for the transportation of illegal narcotics.80  The geographic location of these 
two countries with respect to the United States make for ideal stop over points for 
narcotics en route from coca producing regions in the Andean Ridge.  Essentially, 
Guatemala and El Salvador, like the rest of Central America, are “trapped between the 
world’s biggest suppliers and consumers of cocaine.”81 However, the following sections 
will show that while DTOs do operate in both countries, their activities in El Salvador are 
not as significant as trafficking activity in Guatemala. 
1. DTOs in El Salvador 
Regarding El Salvador, the US Department of State’s most recent International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) states that:  
Heroin and cocaine smuggled through the Eastern Pacific transit routes 
along El Salvador’s coastline. Traffickers using go-fast boats and 
commercial vessels smuggle narcotics through adjacent international and 
Salvadoran waters. Land transit of cocaine and heroin from Colombia is  
typically through El Salvador on the Pan-American Highway. Most drugs 
transiting over land are carried in the luggage of commercial bus 
passengers and in hidden compartments inside commercial tractor-trailers 
traveling north to Guatemala.82 
According to the same report, in 2007, over 4 metric tons (MT) of cocaine were 
seized in Salvadoran territory.  The 2007 UNODC World Drug Report shows cocaine 
seizures in El Salvador were almost insignificant during the period of 1995 to 1999 and 
showed a an increase from 0.4 MT seized in 2000 to a total of 2.7 MT in 2004.83  It must 
be noted that using drug seizures as the sole evidence to gauge DTO activity is not 
                                                 
80 U.S. Department of State, “Counternarcotics: El Salvador,” and U.S. Department of State, 
“Counternarcotics: Guatemala.” 
81 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 9. 
82 U.S. Department of State, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and 
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83 UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007, 26, 184. 
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entirely conclusive; an increase in seizures could simply be evidence of increased 
interdiction activities rather than increased trafficking. That being said, lacking any other 
evidence, there is an indication that over time, from 2000 to the present day, DTO 
activity did increase in El Salvador.   
But, while the seizure of illicit narcotics in Salvadoran territory does indicate that 
DTOs operate in the country, there is a palpable lack of other data regarding the subject. 
A review of the UNODC reports, CRS reports, and news articles provide little to no data 
expounding on the significance of El Salvador in the international drug trade.  The most 
recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report concerning drug trafficking gives one 
mention to El Salvador with respect to trafficking activity.  The report merely mentions 
that the Mexican Sinaloa drug cartel relies on trafficking cells in that country, and this 
evidence is based on the interview of a single unnamed drug expert.84 No other evidence 
is presented. 
2. DTOs in Guatemala 
Whereas little reported evidence, aside from drug seizure data, is available 
concerning DTOs in El Salvador, far more is available for Guatemala.  In early 2005, the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported on the success of investigating 
and then dismantling a Guatemalan-Colombian DTO in which: 
100 individuals linked to this powerful drug trafficking organization have 
been arrested, in excess of 22 kilograms of heroin and 80 kilograms of 
cocaine have been confiscated, and over $1 million in United States 
currency have been seized.85 
UNODC also mentions Guatemala as a significant country in the international drug trade.  
Cited in the UNODC report, a 2005 Boston Globe article stated that: 
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In 2003...the DEA estimated that 150 metric tons, or 330,000 pounds, of 
cocaine moved through Guatemala annually.  But in just two years, the 
problem has dramatically worsened.86 
This article cites “loosely patrolled borders, two coastlines, staggering corruption, 
lax enforcement, and judicial impunity” as all contributing to the use of Guatemala as a 
transit stop for DTOs.87  These assertions are not merely speculation on part of the 
journalist, as a government official was cited: 
''The narco nexus may be stronger than the state now," said Julio César 
Godoy, Guatemala's deputy minister of security. ''There are areas where 
the army, police, local officials all work for narcotraffickers—it's like 
Colombia in the 1980s.”88 
Guatemala is also “the primary landing zone for private aircraft trafficking cocaine from 
Colombia to the United States (making use of hundreds of concealed airstrips), and is 
also used as a transit point for ships carrying cocaine destined for Europe.”89 The World 
Drug Report also notes that, according to Mexican sources, 28% of cocaine entering 
Mexico for the United States comes overland from Guatemala (and Belize).90 
Using World Drug Report data, cocaine seizures in Guatemala from 1995 to the 
present day far outweigh those in El Salvador.  Seizures increased from 1.0 MT in 1995 
to as high as 10 MT in 1999.  There was a significant decrease in seizures in 2000 (1.5 
MT, with its cause being beyond the scope of this paper) but levels peaked again in 2003 
with 9.2 MT seized until decreasing to 5.1 MT in 2005.91  Again, one must understand 
that drug seizure data should not be viewed as the only evidence of DTO activity.  Be that 
as it may, there appears to be a significant amount of drug trade activity in Guatemala, 
especially when compared to El Salvador.  
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3. Effects of DTOs 
It is clear that DTOs are operating with significant scope in Guatemala, and to a 
lesser extent in El Salvador.  But what is sometimes less clear, or at least questionable, 
are the effects of their operations.  The same Boston Globe article previously mentioned 
asserts that of the estimated 150 tons of cocaine that passed through Guatemala annually, 
it has been approximated that 10% is for local consumption and that DTOs are paying 
Guatemalans in cocaine, rather than hard currency.92  This is not wholly accepted by the 
UNODC.  While allowing for the “spillage” of drugs in lower value markets (paying 
workers in kind, rather than with cash)93 UNODC states that “these estimates do not 
resonate with the prevalence rates from drug use surveys.”94  Simply stated, the estimated 
levels of cocaine use in Guatemala do not support the assertion that 15 tons of cocaine are 
staying in the country for local consumption. 
The effects of drug trafficking in Guatemala and El Salvador are seen more 
clearly in each country’s murder rate.  UNODC presents convincing data that there is a 
strong correlation between DTO activity and increasing levels of homicides in both 
countries.  Based on 2002 data, both Guatemala and El Salvador are listed in the top ten 
countries in the world with respect to murder rates per 100,000 people.  They are both in 
the top three in all of Latin America, with 37 and 38 per 100K respectively, behind only 
Colombia with a rate of 72.   They are the top two countries in Central America.95 
With respect to Guatemala, law enforcement data regarding murder rates from 
1996 show an initial increase of murder rates in the first year from 35 to 36 per 100K 
followed by a sharp decline to 24 in 1999.  However, rates have steadily increased from 
26 in 2001 to as high as 47 in 2006. 96  Additionally, the highest murder rates did not 
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occur in Guatemala City and the province of Guatemala, which is the largest urban area 
in the country.  According to data, the highest murder rates occurred in “Escuintla (on the 
Pacific Coast), Petén (site of the so-called ‘airplane graveyards’, where drug traffickers 
scuttle their craft) and Izabel (on the Caribbean coast, hosting the two largest ports in the 
country).97  Here the correlation between DTO activity and violence is seen.  In addition, 
this data apparently helps to negate the assertion that youth gangs are highly involved in 
the drug trade in that while gangs exist in predominantly urban areas, while Izabal and 
Petén are mostly rural.98   
There also appears to be a disturbing rise in the nature and brutality of many of 
the killings in Guatemala.  UNODC reports that the use of contract killers is more 
prevalent and that torture prior to killings is increasing.  In all of 2005 there were 624 
torture related deaths while in just the first month of 2006, there were already 306 
homicides involving torture.99  The violence attributed to DTO activity is echoed in the 
media as well.100 Not only was there increased violence, but it also has spilled over from 
conflict among competing DTOs to acts of violence and corruption involving politicians, 
thereby affecting the political process.101   
In El Salvador, the effects of trafficking activity, as some have argued, appear the 
same.  However, assessment is made more difficult by the lack of reliable crime trend 
data.   El Salvador reports three different murder rates from three separate government 
agencies: 
...there are at least three official homicide rates: one published by the 
police, one by the national forensic science institute, and one published by 
the national prosecution authority.  The forensic data should, at least,  
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agree with the public health data given to the Pan American Health 
Organization, but it does not, suggesting a fourth rate.102 
Even so, existing data did show that in two provinces, La Libertad and Sonsonate, both 
home to the only major ports on the Pacific Coast and near the Guatemalan border, 
murder rates were higher (76 and 79 per 100K, respectively) than those in San Salvador 
(69 per 100K), the most urbanized province.  Additionally, the ports, Acajutla and La 
Libertad, are connected to the Pan American Highway, which is a conduit for overland 
drug trafficking.103  This would suggest, as in the case with Guatemala, that DTO activity 
within port areas shows a strong correlation with violence.   However, UNODC notes that 
both La Libertad and Sonsonate are highly urbanized provinces.104  This could possibly 
add support to the assertion that youth gangs are significant contributors to the high 
murder rates in El Salvador.       
4. Summary: Drug Trafficking Organizations in El Salvador and 
Guatemala 
The evidence shows that DTOs appear to be far more active in Guatemala than in 
El Salvador.  Based on drug seizure data over the past years far more activity is seen in 
Guatemala.  Geography and history seem to be the main reasons for this: Guatemala has 
both a Pacific and a Caribbean coastline, providing two avenues for DTOs to transit 
coastal areas.  Having a longer Pacific coastline than El Salvador may also contribute by 
providing more land from which traffickers can choose to offload their cargo for ground 
transportation.  El Salvador only has access to the Pacific Ocean, thereby denying 
maritime traffickers in the Caribbean with any transit port.     Guatemala has numerous 
abandoned airfields available in isolated areas for illicit use, whereas El Salvador is a 
small and densely populated country.  Further, Guatemala is closer to Mexico and shares 
a common border, increasing its importance to drug traffickers.  Finally, the Guatemalan 
military has had a long history of involvement in the drug trade during, and after, 
                                                 
102 UNODC, “Crime and Development,” 52. 
103 Ibid., 54. 
104 Ibid. 
 27
authoritarian rule.  As for the effects of drug trafficking through Guatemala, data 
regarding murder rates shows that more homicides are committed in provinces where 
there is a high degree of DTO activity.  With this, a positive correlation between violence 
and DTOs is clear.   As for El Salvador, unreliable crime trend data makes any 
correlation between trafficking activity and violence difficult to ascertain.  
In sum, the evidence shows that DTOs appear to be far more active in Guatemala 
than in El Salvador. Drug trafficking organizations in both countries present a domestic 
threat in the form of associated violence, though the link is more questionable in El 
Salvador than in Guatemala.  Additionally, DTO activity in Guatemala and El Salvador 
do pose a serious threat to the United States in the form of the harmful effects that these 
drugs have on our society.  
E. ORGANIZED CRIME 
Organized criminal activity—characterized by high levels of violence and 
corruption, penetration of the licit economy, and the high level of sophistication of the 
organizations—is far more prevalent in Guatemala than in El Salvador.   
1. El Salvador: Organized Crime  
In the years after the signing of the peace accords in El Salvador, there was a 
surge in crime and violence, as evidenced by an increase in annual homicides from 3,229 
in 1992 to over 9,000 in 1994.105  As Charles Call notes, “by 1995 deaths by homicide 
exceeded the average annual number of deaths during the twelve-year war, and in 1996 
El Salvador’s homicide rate reached 139 per 100,000, the second highest in the world 
according to one study.”106 At the same time, there was a concern that organized crime 
would show a similar increase, as has happened in so many other post-conflict 
environments.  William Stanley and Robert Loosle write: 
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Of particular concern was the expansion of organized crime, ranging from 
heavily armed rural gangs that robbed and terrorized communities and 
highway travelers, to highly sophisticated kidnapping and car theft rings.   
Such organizations were not new to El Salvador, nor was support from 
and participation by elements of the old security forces and the military a 
novelty.107 
There was the fear that corrupt former security personnel, “trained in the use of 
arms, organized into tightly knit groups, and familiar with the ways of crime…could 
easily turn into significant organized criminal networks.”108  Stanley and Loosle assert 
that the “demobilization of tens of thousands of former soldiers, policemen, and guerilla 
combatants into a context of inadequate employment” had fed the burgeoning crime wave 
in the wake of the transition.109   
  Organized crime groups with corrupt links to the state and political system were 
a feature of the post-conflict environment. The Washington Office on Latin America 
(WOLA), in a 2007 special report, cited the 1993 Truth Commission report that 
suggested that former clandestine military security forces had expanded into organized 
crime.110  WOLA, drawing on the work of the combined United Nations and Salvadoran 
Grupo Conjunto (Joint Group) that was established in 1993 to investigate the activities of 
illegal armed groups, found that “these groups had integrated with organized criminal 
networks, relying on violence to intimidate or eliminate those who threatened their 
political or money-making interests.”111  The key word here is “political”: criminal 
entities with corrupt links to political elements of the state.  WOLA asserts: 
Their politically motivated activities were directed primarily against local 
political or social leaders.  In urban areas, these criminal-political 
groupings were used to target high-profile political leaders…[and]  
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evidence revealed the high degree of organization and sophisticated 
logistical capabilities attained by these groups to carry out their 
activities.112 
For example, in early 1994, an attempt was made on the life of FMLN leader 
María Marta Valladares when her bodyguard was driving to her residence.  Valladares 
was not in the vehicle as it was sprayed by bullets from gunmen who exited from another 
car.  The bodyguard was slightly wounded.  Not long after the attack political activist 
Edmundo López found an anonymous note at his residence that read “FMLN, now you 
see what we do if you don’t want more dead like this get out of here you damned 
cowards.”113  A few months later Valladares was again the victim of an attempt on her 
life when assailants opened fire on her vehicle.  Again, however, only the bodyguard in 
the vehicle was injured.  The degree of sophistication of these attempts led the Joint 
Group to conclude that they could only have been carried out by a highly organized 
criminal group.114   
Organized crime groups were also involved in traditional criminal activities, with 
the complicity of key members of state institutions.  To underscore the involvement of 
elements of the state in organized crime, the Joint Group report, released in 1994, stated 
that: 
[I]t is impossible for organized criminal networks to sustain themselves 
without the complicity or active support from high-ranking officials of the 
security forces…some of these illegal activities are directed, supported, 
covered-up and tolerated by members of the military and police 
institutions and the judicial and municipal organs.115 
Interestingly, WOLA cites these 1993 and 1994 reports to include the Salvadoran 
state as an example of the “captive state” in Latin America in 2007.  This is a 
fundamentally mistaken view. In fact, the findings of the Truth Commission (1993) and 
the Joint Group (1994) brought attention to the problem of corruption and political 
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violence in the early to mid-1990s and it was subsequently dealt with by the government.  
For example, in June of 1995 the PNC had detained the “Benedictos Band,” reputed to be 
a powerful trafficking organization specializing in stolen vehicles, whose leader was “a 
former alternate National Conservative Party (PNC) deputy presumed to have links 
dating back to the war to powerful elements of the armed forces.”116 The next month the 
PNC had detained several individuals linked to a clandestine vigilante group, La Sombra 
Negro (the Black Shadow).  Among those detained were an important businessman, a 
financier, and four members of the police force itself.117 
In recent years, the perceptions of crime and corruption in El Salvador have been 
shown to be lower than immediately following the peace accords and certainly when in 
comparison to Guatemala.  An examination of corruption and victimization surveys 
indicates as much.  Charles Call notes that, “in a 1996 poll, fifty-six percent of 
respondents expressed ‘little’ or ‘no’ confidence in the PNC, 28 percent said they had 
‘some’ confidence in the PNC, and only 15 percent expressed ‘much’ confidence in the 
new police force. By 2001, the numbers had improved, with 25 percent having ‘much’ 
confidence in the police force and 45 percent expressing little or no confidence.”118  
More recently, the 2008 Transparency International Global Corruption Report ranks El 
Salvador as 67th out of the 180 countries examined.  While not an exemplary score, it is 
near the top third and, by comparison, far better than Guatemala, which was ranked in the 
bottom half of all countries, with a score of 111.119 The 2008 AmericasBarometer 
Insights victimization survey data also shows a difference between the two countries 
concerning corruption linked to the police.  Whereas 8.2% of the population of El 
Salvador that claimed that they were solicited for a bribe by police, 14.3% of the 
population in Guatemala responded in kind.120   
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In sum, despite the radical upsurge in violent crime in the post-conflict period, the 
available evidence suggests that criminal groups were not able to penetrate the state 
permanently and that the ties that existed in the years immediately following the peace 
accords were largely broken through state action.  Subsequent sections of the thesis will 
explore the reasons why this happened. 
2. Guatemala: Organized Crime 
The organized crime situation in Guatemala, in comparison to both El Salvador as 
well as to the rest of the region, is abhorrent, and far easier to illuminate.  With origins 
dating back to the clandestine military groups specializing in counterinsurgency, similar 
to the death squads in El Salvador, organized criminal entities in Guatemala have had in 
the past, and maintain now, a virtual stranglehold on the country.  A seminal work 
highlighting the problem of organized crime in Guatemala is the 2003 WOLA report 
Hidden Powers, in which authors Susan Peacock and Adriana Beltrán examine in depth 
the ties of these former military and security force members to organized crime.  The 
authors write: 
In Guatemala, the hidden powers specialize in connections that allow them 
to carry out crimes involving state resources—skimming and bribery at 
customs, corruption in the awarding of lucrative contracts, bribery and 
kickbacks.  At the same time they manipulate the justice system in order to 
protect themselves from prosecution.121 
The state of organized crime and the hidden powers is just as bad recent times as 
it was when the report was released.  A 2007 WOLA report notes that many in 
Guatemala believe “that many government officials and law enforcement officers 
participate regularly in criminal acts and corruption.”122 The WOLA report also notes 
that organized crime has penetrated deep into the state in that “their reach extends into 
the legislature, customs, and other state agencies.  The result has been a devastating 
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deterioration of state institutions and the rule of law.”123 In Guatemala, therefore, 
organized crime exists and displays all of its hallmarks.  Far greater emphasis and 
analysis of organized crime in Guatemala will be found in the following chapters and 
sections. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime are present in both El Salvador and 
Guatemala, though the degree to which each is prevalent varies by country.  Gangs are 
much more of a problem in El Salvador than in Guatemala, while the converse is true 
with respect to drug trafficking organizations.  Contrary to the attention and commentary 
provided by many in the media, the problem of gangs and gang violence are, while 
important issues to contend with, not the most serious threat facing El Salvador and 
Guatemala.  Additionally, drug trafficking, while contributing to, and mimicking many 
characteristics of, organized crime, does not pose as great a threat as organized crime 
itself.  Organized crime syndicates, with their involvement in numerous illicit activities, 
drug trafficking being but one, poses the most immediate threat.  The threat of crime and 
violence caused by gangs and drug trafficking activity is not as significant as the threat of 
violence and corruption caused by sophisticated entities that permeate state institutions 
and threaten democracy in both countries.  This being said, the remainder of this thesis 
will show the differences in the causes, levels, and effects organized crime in El Salvador 
and Guatemala as brought about by differing approaches to security sector reform and 
differing political party systems.   
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III. POST-CONFLICT POLICE REFORM AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
ORGANIZED CRIME 
The transitions to democracy have been difficult for both nations as each had to 
contend with the social conditions created by years of internal conflict and burgeoning 
poverty.  Military downsizing and the process of police reform carried out in accordance 
with the peace treaties that ended the internal conflict are said to have created security 
vacuums that criminals could exploit.124 However, as the previous chapter showed, 
significantly different patterns of criminal activity evolved in the two countries.  In 
particular, organized crime was able to take advantage of the post-conflict security 
environment in Guatemala but not El Salvador. This chapter shows how diverging 
processes of police reform contributed to these different outcomes.    
One of the major conditions stipulated in the peace accords in both countries was 
the immediate reform of the state security apparatus.  Prior to the accords, both El 
Salvador and Guatemala utilized the military and subordinate civilian components as the 
main security force.  Both countries have a long history of repression, violence and 
human rights abuses attributed to the militarized security apparatus.  This chapter shows 
that in El Salvador, security sector reform essentially purged the new PNC of militarized 
elements that could have later evolved into corrupt police forces.  Conversely, the 
security sector reform in Guatemala retained a clandestine militarized element with ties to 
organized crime within its ranks.  It was this element that evolved into the various corrupt 
networks linked to organized crime that exists today.  This chapter will first examine the 
case of El Salvador, followed by Guatemala in a close comparative analysis, in an effort 
to highlight the important differences between the two.   
A. EL SALVADOR 
In 1989, changing conditions on the global and domestic front brought the 
government of El Salvador and the insurgency to the peace table. One of the most 
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important intentions of the peace accords was to demilitarize the security apparatus.  By 
adhering to the democratic intent of the accords, El Salvador had effectively purged the 
police force of much of its former militarized personnel.  While this reform process had 
serious near term consequences, specifically a rise in crime and violence immediately 
following the dismantling of the former security apparatus, El Salvador was, in the long 
term, able to prevent corrupt former security personnel with ties to organized crime 
entities from operating wholesale within the new police force.    
1. The Security Apparatus During Civil War  
In order to understand the security sector reforms that took place at the time of the 
peace accords and during the transition to democracy, an examination of the security 
institutions that were in place prior to the accords is warranted.  For much of the 
twentieth century internal security in El Salvador was the task of the military.  
Subordinate to the Ministry of Defense were the National Guard, the National Police 
(PN) and the Treasury Police.  According to Edgardo Amaya: 
These cuerpos de seguridad pública (public-security forces, CUSEP) 
played a major role in repressing and controlling social conflict.  The 
National Guard, in particular, was deployed in El Salvador’s rural areas, 
and, under an explicit legal mandate, it assisted large landowners and 
agricultural interests in repressing labor sectors that resisted the existing 
work conditions.125 
Amaya asserts that the twelve-year civil war that began in 1980 was largely in 
response to the military controlled government’s use of this security apparatus to 
maintain the political and social status quo and to “disciple, dominate, and control the 
population...”126 Charles Call writes: 
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Civil war was rooted in class and ideological, rather than religious or 
ethnic, divisions in an economic system whereby a small number of 
landed elites controlled the state in an alliance with a powerful military.127 
By the end of the 1970s, five separate guerilla organizations and several other 
rural leftist and centrist social movements were active in opposing the authoritarian 
government and the landed elite.  In response to growing opposition, the military 
increased repression of the social movements and conducted brutal death squad 
operations that culminated in a record of 1000 political murders per month in 1980.  
Though the guerilla groups did conduct killings at this time as well, the majority of 
deaths were the cause of the military’s security forces.  The increased repression and 
violence perpetrated by the security forces polarized the nation and prompted the five 
main guerilla movements to band together in armed resistance under the single banner of 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN).  Additionally, the leftist and centrist 
social movements and organizations that received the brunt of the security forces’ 
violence coalesced into the Revolutionary Democratic Front.128  For the next twelve 
years, El Salvador would endure civil war in which, as William Stanley notes, “the 
military continued to amass a truly appalling human rights record, committing large-scale 
massacres in rural areas and continuing death squad killings: at least 50,000 unarmed 
civilians were murdered by state forces, most during the early 1980s.”129 
2. The Peace Accords 
In 1989, Alfredo Cristiani was elected president and his party, the right-wing 
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), was in power in El Salvador.  Though 
promises were made to continue cursory peace negotiations with FMLN that had failed in 
previous years, the government increased its efforts against the FMLN and continued 
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repression of opposition movements.130  However, as Call notes, two important events 
prompted both sides to recognize a stalemate and seek a resolution.  First, the end of the 
Cold War signaled also the end of external support for both the authoritarian government 
and the FMLN.  For the FMLN, assistance from Soviet bloc nations, such as Cuba, would 
become far less likely, and for ARENA, a shift in Central American policy that came 
with the new Bush administration meant that the military could no longer count on 
unlimited support form the United States, which had supported the government with 
military aid during the civil war.131  Second, in late 1989, the FMLN initiated a 
coordinated attack on military bases and brought a 2000 combatant-strong offensive into 
San Salvador.  On the one hand, the offensive was a military failure.  It brought to light 
the FMLN’s inability to win the civil war by armed force, thereby prompting many die-
hard elements within the movement to seek peace.  On the other hand, it was a political 
success, helping to convince many economic elites that a peace agreement was perhaps 
necessary.  Additionally, when six Jesuit priests, and two others, were killed at the 
Central American University in San Salvador during the offensive, it was suspected (and 
later confirmed) that the Salvadoran military was responsible, resulting in public outcry 
for the atrocity both domestically and internationally and thereby prompting the United 
States to suspend further aid until progress was made at the peace table.132  Both ARENA 
and many leaders in FMLN came to the conclusion that a negotiated peace was far better 
than a protracted conflict that would end in stalemate.133 
3. Police Reform 
In January of 1992, the ARENA-led government and the FMLN signed the peace 
accords that marked the transition to democracy and begin reforming the security 
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apparatus.  El Salvador did not undertake these reforms alone.  Throughout the peace 
negotiations that led to the 1992 accords, substantial international mediation, mainly from 
the United Nations, was provided.134  Regarding police reform, the UN, along with the 
United States, Canada, Sweden, and Spain all offered and provided police training 
programs and reform projects.135  The UN established an observer mission, ONUSAL, to 
monitor progress of the reforms to ensure they were in keeping with the accords.  
Additionally, a special UN police component, CIVPOL, was deployed to monitor police 
reforms and provide training.136 
One of the major and most important tenets of the accords was the transformation 
of the security apparatus from military to civilian control.137  However, the establishment 
of a new, civilian controlled, police force in El Salvador would prove very difficult.  The 
most immediate matter for security forces was dealing with the security vacuum that was 
established by the peace accords when “the number of members of the security forces 
were cut from 60,000 to 6000 in the course of a few weeks.”138  The reduction in forces 
was facilitated by the demobilization of the National Guard and the Treasury Police, 
leaving the National Police as the only domestic security apparatus in operation after the 
peace agreements.139   
This reduction contributed to a surge in crime and violence following the peace 
accords, evidenced by an estimated threefold increase in annual homicides from 3,229 in 
1992 to over 9,000 in 1994.140  The reduction in security forces notwithstanding, several 
factors were responsible for this increase in criminal activity, including the prevalent 
culture of violence, the availability of weapons, as well as pervasive poverty and 
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inequality.141 Additionally, corrupt former security personnel, “trained in the use of arms, 
organized into tightly knit groups, and familiar with the ways of crime…could easily turn 
into significant organized criminal networks.”142 
The police reform agreed to in the peace accords was very ambitious and, not 
surprisingly, met with some resistance from the military.  According to the peace 
agreements, the new PNC was to be comprised of 20% personnel from the demobilized 
National Police (PN), 20% from the demobilized FMLN, and 60% from new civilian 
recruits.143  In order to recruit, train, and equip the new police force a new police 
academy, the Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (ANSP) was established.  In 
addition, the accords stipulated higher minimum education requirements for all levels of 
the police structure.  Basic police agent applicants were required to have, at first a 9th 
grade education, but this requirement was later raised to a 12th grade education.  Three 
years of university education was required for inspectors, and five-year university 
degrees were required for police commissioner.144  It was the goal of this new academy 
to provide some 5,700 new police agents, within two years, before the PNC would 
assume full responsibility for domestic security.  In the interim, the PN was to act as the 
sole security apparatus.145  As previously noted, the size of the PN (approximately 6,000 
personnel) was grossly inadequate to combat the severe increases in crime and violence, 
thereby making it an unrealistic assumption that this interim security force could deal 
effectively with rising crime rates and violence.    
The military attempted to undermine, or at least delay, the establishment of the 
fledgling police force.  Call notes that “the military not only saw the new police force as a 
threat to its ability to continue corrupt behavior, but also worried that former guerillas 
inside the PNC might use the new police force to itself to destabilize the state.”146  In 
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light of these concerns, the military impeded the establishment of the ANSP by taking 
over facilities set aside for the new academy and withholding basic equipment such as 
cars, radios, and weapons.147  
Despite this, the ANSP graduated its first class in August of 1992.148  However, 
because it was stipulated in the accords that 20% of the new PNC could be from the 
former security forces its effectiveness was, in the near term, undermined. José Miguel 
Cruz writes: 
…the PNC began with little practical experience but still with substantial 
risks to authoritarian contamination.  This is because most of the old 
regime’s personnel had been trained for political repression rather than 
crime prevention or investigation.149  
To further Cruz’s assertion concerning “authoritarian contamination,” two intact 
police units, the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) and the Anti-Narcotics Unit (UEA) 
were transferred directly from the PN into the PNC after minimal retraining at the ANSP 
in 1993.  Following this transfer, human rights abuses attributed to the PNC increased 
and “some thirteen of the hundred SIU agents transferred to the PNC were eventually 
implicated in politically motivated murders or in their cover-up.”150   
As will be shown in the following sections, however, the immediate ill effects of 
dismantling the security apparatus were not to last and the agreement to limit the number 
of former security personnel from entering the new police force had quite positive 
implications for long-term success.  A purge of most of the former militarized security 
forces created an environment within the new security apparatus in which corruption and 
criminal activity was limited. 
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4. Measuring Success of Police Reform 
Despite the initial problems, scholars and analysts cite the establishment of the 
PNC as a success, and a critical element in stabilizing the country.  Orlando Perez writes 
that “the new police academy that was created from scratch trained 5,700 police agents 
and officers by the 1994 deadline set forth in the Peace Accords…” and that “the 
Salvadorian police force has made an overall successful transition, despite its remaining 
problems.”151  Call writes: 
The creation of the national Civilian Police (PNC) was crucial for peace 
and democracy…Government negotiator David Escobar Galindo called 
the PNC the most significant (‘más transcendtal’) institution to come out 
of the reforms, and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali hailed 
the new police force in 1995 as ‘one of the fundamental elements of the 
peace accords…’152  
These observers judge the reform a success because it transformed the security 
apparatus from a militarized institution into a transparent and civilian-oriented institution  
However, if success is determined by the ability of the reformed security apparatus to 
reduce crime and violence and provide a secure environment for the citizenry, then the 
reforms must be viewed as unsuccessful, or at the very least, not very effective.  Stanley 
asserts that, “the PNC has not been successful in providing adequate security for the 
Salvadoran public, which has faced an unprecedented crime wave and a murder rate that 
exceeds the casualty rate during the civil war.”153  Even Call notes that “effectiveness 
ultimately proved to be the Achilles heel of the new police” and that “between 1993 and 
1999, crime would consistently be ranked as the single most important problem facing 
the country in surveys conducted by the Central American University’s Public Opinion 
Institute (IUDOP).”154 The prevalence of violence and crime has not diminished much 
since the turn of the century.  As of 2005, El Salvador reported a homicide rate of 59 per 
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100,000 inhabitants.155  This is an increase from 38 per 100,000 reported in 2002, in 
which El Salvador was ranked the FIFTH most violent country in the world based on 
homicide rates.156  Therefore, in the context of general security of the populace today and 
in light of the PNC’s inability to deter and reduce crime and violence following the peace 
accords, it may certainly be an exaggeration to term police reform in El Salvador a 
complete success. 
5. Impact of Police Reform on Organized Crime 
Little attention has been paid to the impact of police reform on organized crime.  
As was noted in Chapter I, organized crime in the country, while it still exists, is not 
nearly the problem that it is in Guatemala.  Further, the problem of gangs and gang 
violence seem to far outweigh the violence and corruption that results from organized 
crime.  The reason for this is most likely because of the democratic reforms negotiated 
and implemented in the security sector.   
The stipulation to have no more than 20% of the new PNC come from the former 
militarized PN, and no more than 20% from former FMLN combatants played a major 
role in this respect.  Essentially, El Salvador had purged the security sector of a great 
number of personnel who might otherwise have remained within the security apparatus 
and utilized their combat and clandestine experience to form criminal entities within the 
state.  The purging did make available thousands of former military and police for 
employment in criminal groups outside the state.  WOLA notes: 
Indeed, the transition from war to peace left many members of the old 
security forces and death squads out of work and without many prospects 
for employment.  Looking for a new way of life in which to make use of 
their skills, many joined the organized criminal world.157 
It must also be reiterated, however, that El Salvador had dealt with the growing 
problem of organized crime after the 1994 Joint Report highlighted the situation and 
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domestic, as well as international attention, was focused on the problem.  Therefore, 
while El Salvador’s reforms actually helped to foster an increase in organized crime 
activity after the peace accords, it had dealt with the problem such that organized 
criminal and political violence has decreased in the years since.  Additionally, by purging 
the security sector of experienced and militarized security personnel, El Salvador 
prevented an opportunity for these elements to corrupt the security forces in later years.   
The importance of the purging of the police forces (and the state’s willingness to target 
organized crime after the transition) becomes even more evident when viewed in light of 
Guatemala’s very different experience.  . 
B. GUATEMALA 
The conditions that led to the peace negotiations in Guatemala were far different 
from those in El Salvador.  Additionally, security sector reform in Guatemala took a far 
different approach.  Similar to El Salvador, one of the major tenets of the peace accords 
that the two sides in Guatemala had agreed to was demilitarization of the security sector.  
While this was the intent of the agreement, in practice, it was not the reality.  Citing fears 
of a security vacuum as was seen in El Salvador following its initial police reforms, 
Guatemalan officials decided to utilize most of the militarized former security sector in 
the new police force.  This effectively enabled thousands of the corrupt personnel with 
ties to organized crime entities to infiltrate the security sector and operate with impunity.  
While crime and violence in the near term was abated, the environment that was created 
by the reforms allowed for corruption to evolve and develop into what is seen today.    
1. The Security Apparatus During Civil War  
The security conditions present in Guatemala were, on the surface, very similar to 
those in El Salvador.  Since the beginning of the civil war that began in the early 1960s 
with armed resistance by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), Guatemala endured a 
conflict that “pitted an insurgency that sought to achieve socialist revolution against a 
state devoted to suppressing the revolutionaries and excluding leftist parties from 
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political competition.”158 The government suppressed opposition in attempts to maintain 
the status quo throughout most of the later half of the twentieth century.  Initially, the 
government was able to subdue leftist opposition by 1967 but by the late 1970s and early 
1980s, a rural insurgency took root in the highlands of the northeast and “government 
forces quickly and ruthlessly suppressed the rebellion.”159  As in El Salvador, the various 
separate guerilla movements came together under a single banner.  In 1982, the FAR, the 
Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), and the 
Communist Party of Guatemala joined together to form the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity (URNG).160   
Guatemala, like El Salvador, relied on the military for domestic security during 
the conflict, and the same patterns of brutal state control were employed.  Marie-Louise 
Glebbeek writes: “over 200,000 people were killed or disappeared as a result of political 
violence” and “during the conflict, the military institutions monopolised their institutional 
strength against all organized segments of society, thereby creating a civil-military 
political regime of violence and repression.”161 Along with a Treasury Guard, Guatemala 
also employed a National Police (PN) that was subordinate to the military, in particular 
the military’s intelligence apparatus, or the G–2.  Citing testimony from a former member 
of the G–2, Glebbeek notes: “…what the G–2 says is what the National Police does, they 
carry out military orders, only they do it in a more dirty way.”162  Basically, the PN 
carried out counterinsurgency operations in which human rights abuses were a hallmark.   
2. The Peace Accords 
While Guatemala’s security apparatus was in many ways similar to El Salvador’s, 
the similarities in the overall security conditions that led to the signing of the peace 
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accords was far different.  First, although Guatemala did receive military assistance from 
the United States in combating leftist and communist movements during the 1960s and 
1970s, most aid was severed when President Jimmy Carter highlighted human rights as a 
critical policy in 1977.163  It is commonly cited that the end of the Cold War meant the 
end of leftist insurgencies and ideological civil conflict in Latin America.164  However, as 
is seen in this case, the incentives for both sides to negotiate a peace settlement was not 
influenced by the end of the Cold War and the resulting shifts in U.S. or Soviet bloc aid 
policy.  Guatemala did not see both sides reach a consolidated a peace until five years 
after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.  Second, no single 
culminating event, like the FMLN’s offensive of 1989 in El Salvador, prompted either 
the URNG or the government to seek a peace.  Rather, the peace process was a long and 
drawn out affair that actually began in 1989 with a “national dialogue” 165 and is explored 
in depth by Stanley and Holiday, whose analysis is the basis for the following summary. 
Stanley and Holiday write: “By the mid-1980s the war was a prolonged, 
sputtering conflict in which the URNG managed to survive and periodically attack 
government forces or economic targets.”166 The URNG began to realize that military 
victory was not an option and “leaders perceived that real gains could be achieved at the 
table that exceeded those likely to be won on the battlefield.”167 Stanley and Holiday cite 
three factors that stalled the initial peace talks.  First, in the late 1980s, a negotiated peace 
settlement was certainly in the interest of the URNG, but not of the government or 
conservative economic elites.  The URNG’s limited capacity as a military force failed to 
create a sense of urgency within the government for peace negotiations.  Second, various 
specific agreements met with resistance from the factions of the armed forces, the 
economic elites, and/or the URNG.  Third, because Guatemala was not reliant upon 
international aid, leverage from the international community was almost non-existent. 
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By late 1993, however, conditions changed.  The UN began mediating the peace 
talks and by late 1994 it established a human rights observer mission (MINUGUA) in the 
country to monitor progress.  Additionally, elements within the government, realizing 
Guatemala’s isolation on the world stage due to an abysmal human rights record, began 
to understand that proceeding with negotiations would open doors to foreign aid and 
build confidence for foreign investment.  Finally, the dynamics of the peace talks would 
change with the 1995 elections.  Stanley and Holiday cite two aspects of these elections 
as critical to the peace process.  First, the presence of MINUGUA had opened political 
representation by a leftist party, the New Guatemala Democratic Front, which gained six 
congressional seats.  Though a small number by comparison to the eighty seats up for 
election, this small electoral victory instilled confidence in the URNG that substantial 
gains may be made by negotiating.  Second, URNG confidence in newly elected 
President Alvaro Arzú was high, despite the fact that he was from an elite family and 
supported by both the military and business sectors.168  As Stanley and Holiday’s 
analysis shows, it was in the context of evolving conditions and incentives over time that 
led both sides to pursue a peace settlement.   
The conditions that led to the peace accords affected how security sector reform 
was to be implemented and, as will be shown the following sections, very different from 
what was seen in El Salvador.  Specifically, while FMLN in El Salvador possessed a 
strong position at the negotiating table and was able to press for more radical reforms, the 
URNG was not nearly as fortunate and was thereby relegated to accepting terms that 
were not in keeping with the democratic intent of the accords.   
3. Police Reform 
In September 1996, the Arzú administration and the URNG signed the peace 
accords.  The “Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the 
Armed Forces in a Democratic Society,” herein referred to simply as “The Agreement,” 
proposed, among other things, that “a set of constitutional amendments that would take 
the policing and domestic security out of the hands of the military, and establish instead a 
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National Civilian Police (PNC), with a monopoly on internal security duties….”169 As 
Glebbeek notes, the main tenets of The Agreement included: 
First, the expansion in the number of police, from the current 12,000 to 
20,000 by the end of 1999.  Second, constitutional changes to remove the 
military from internal security tasks and give a single PNC force that 
responsibility.  Third, a government commitment to revamp public 
security laws and structures with support of the United Nations 
Verification Commission (MINUGUA) and the international community.  
Fourth, a government commitment to establish a formal police hiring and 
promotions policy, including the requirement that new members of the 
PNC receive a six month course at the Police Academy.170   
The case of police reforms in both Guatemala and El Salvador bear some 
similarities, but many more differences.  In general, the intention to establish a new 
civilian-controlled police force is seen in both countries, as is the removal of the military 
from the security apparatus.  Similarly, the timeline set to establish a specific police force 
size, in this case 20,000 new police agents by 1999, is reminiscent of the reforms in El 
Salvador.  However, both the terms of the peace accords and their subsequent 
implementation in Guatemala fell far short of any goal of producing a police force based 
on democratic ideals that would move away from the corruption, human rights abuses, 
and authoritarianism of the previous security apparatus. 
Whereas El Salvador stipulated that only 20% of the new PNC could be 
comprised of former military or PN members in order to provide for a new force that was 
mostly free of authoritarian or insurgent influences, the Guatemalan reforms stipulated no 
such thing.  In fact, according to Glebbeek: “One of the first decisions made by the 
Guatemalan government and accepted by the URNG during the peace talks was, to 
incorporate most members of the old police force into the new PNC.”171  Additionally, 
there was no screening process to identify police agents with past criminal histories or 
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human rights violations, negating further the intent of the accords. 172    Not wanting to 
waste time training new recruits in the midst of burgeoning crime and violence, “this 
decision was meant to protect Guatemala against a crime wave, which could have arisen 
when the old forces were dissolved before a new force was up to strength, as happened in 
neighboring El Salvador.”173  In summary, “the Arzú government took some shortcuts, in 
which rapid deployment took precedence over deeper measures needed to ensure the 
long-term quality, professionalism and efficacy of the PNC.”174 
Reform in El Salvador, as previously mentioned, was conducted with the 
assistance of the UN and several donor nations.  The UN, the United States and other 
nations in Europe and Asia provided funds, technical assistance, and training.  While 
ONUSAL in El Salvador was able to deploy a CIVPOL component, “MINUGUA had no 
mandate to deploy a CIVPOL component to monitor police during the transition, nor to 
provide training and other assistance.”175  Guatemala chose, early on, a bi-lateral route 
for the development and training of the new PNC.  According to Stanley, “Before [The 
Agreement] was even signed, the Guatemalan government had reached an exclusive 
agreement with the Spanish Civil Guard (GCE) to train and advise the new force.  GCE 
advisors proceeded to write a draft of the enabling legislation for the PNC, without taking 
into account the accord being negotiated between the government and the URNG.”176  
This legislation passed without opposition, even though it “disregarded many points in 
[The Agreement]…” such as applying no standards for professionalism and offering no 
safe-guard against admitting former police agents with human rights abuses into the new 
force.177  Glebbeek claims that it is unclear exactly why Guatemala chose a bilateral 
approach with a single entity to train its police but notes that: “Guatemalan leaders 
claimed they wanted to avoid the Salvadoran model of multiple donors and the mixed 
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messages they said came from this approach.”178  Additionally, observers at the time 
questioned whether the militarized model of the GCE was an appropriate one to 
emulate.179 Whatever the case, Guatemalan police reforms in this respect stand in 
contrast to the multi-lateral and transparent approach taken by El Salvador and seem to 
negate, at least in spirit, the third tenet of The Agreement in which the United Nations 
and the international community were to play significant roles.  Further, training provided 
by the GCE does not seem to hold within the spirit of forming a new, non-militarized 
police force. 
The police academy in El Salvador, as stipulated by the accords, required a 
minimum of a twelfth-grade education for applicants while promotion to inspector or 
commissioner required three-year university training or a five-year university degree 
respectively.  The education requirements for police counterparts in Guatemala were not 
nearly as stringent.  In 1977, regulation was enacted that stipulated police applicants must 
have a minimum of a sixth-grade education and be able to pass the academy course.   
This requirement remained with the formation of the new academy but when many 
observers noted that large numbers of applicants could not pass the training curriculum, 
the minimum requirement was eventually raised to a ninth-grade education.180  Even so, 
the aptitude of a great portion of the academy’s trainees (both new and recycled former 
PN members) was not sufficient in order to excel.  Additionally, the quality of instruction 
at the academy was determined to be deficient and new police agents were deemed 
inadequately prepared for the mission once they graduated and entered service.181  It has 
also been suggested that of those members from the former PN that were recycled 
through the academy, very many, despite poor aptitude and performance as well as 
uncertain criminal backgrounds, were allowed to graduate regardless.182  
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4. Measuring Success of Police Reform 
As with the case of El Salvador, defining success of the police reform is a matter 
of observing the extent to which it followed the accords and created a reorganized force 
subordinated to democratic civilian control and effective in dealing with violence and 
crime both immediately after the reforms as well in recent years.  With respect to 
following the intent of the accords, specifically the four tenets cited above, evidence 
shows that Guatemala’s police reform was a failure.  Only one goal, the deployment of 
20,000 police agents by 1999, was mostly met.  Stanley writes:  
By mid-2000 the PNC largely completed its initial deployment and 
assumed full responsibility for public security, a mere three and a half 
years after the signing of the final accords.  This is an important 
achievement and, in the words of one police official, “the one area of the 
accords in which the most implementation has taken place.”183 
However, while the size of the force may be keeping with the letter of the agreed 
upon accords, the construct of the deployed force, specifically an evident majority of 
former PN agents, did not keep in with the intent of the accords.  The intent of the 
accords was to demilitarize the security sector.  Whereas El Salvador had written 
agreements to limit the number of former security personnel in the new police force, the 
reforms agreed to in Guatemala stipulated no such limitation, effectively allowing 
officials to fill the ranks of the police with whom they chose.   
The size of the PNC in October of 1999 was 17,330, with 36.5% being new 
recruits.184  This implies that over 73% of the new PNC was comprised of members of 
the former PN.  Previous discussion also notes that Guatemala did not work fully with the 
international community, choosing a bilateral agreement with the GCE and limiting 
MINUGUA’s role in training and monitoring the new security force.  Finally, scholars 
note that the training received by new recruits and the recycled former PN agents was 
quite deficient, indicating again that though the letter of the accords was met, the intent of 
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the accords, producing an effective and demilitarized PNC force, was not.185  By all 
accounts, and certainly in comparison to El Salvador, Guatemalan police reform cannot 
be viewed as a success in terms of creating a demilitarized police force. 
In observing the effectiveness of the reforms, however, an interesting point needs 
to be addressed.  Because the Arzú administration claimed that they feared a security 
vacuum following the peace accords similar to the one that occurred in El Salvador, the 
decision was made to rapidly deploy a new police force comprised mostly of former PN 
members.  Writing in 2000, Stanley notes: 
The existing crime problem in Guatemala is unlikely to worsen because of 
the end of the war.  Crime was already high by the early 1990s, and there 
is little evidence of increases resulting from the post-war transition.  In 
contrast to El Salvador, the Guatemala accords do not call for the 
demobilization of a significant portion of the public security apparatus 
before the deployment of the PNC.186  
Whether or not a security vacuum would have existed in Guatemala if similar 
police reform like that undertaken in El Salvador is uncertain, or at least not specifically 
stated by the scholars reviewed.  However, it is interesting to note that even though the 
decision to rapidly deploy the new force may have not been entirely justified, at least 
according to Stanley, data does in fact point to a reduction in the homicide rate from 37 
per 100,000 in 1997 to as low as 24 per 100,000 in 1999.187  Further, the UNODC does 
note that in Guatemala, “homicides declined sharply following the signing of the Peace 
Accords in 1996.…”188 If the measure of effectiveness is based on the declining 
homicides rates, then it does appear that the new PNC was effective.  Additional data 
supports this assertion.  In 2000, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 
reported that victimization rates in Guatemala had significantly declined from 67% in 
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1996 to 42% in 1999.189  Taken together, the data indicates that the deployment of the 
new PNC proved effective in reducing crime and violence for a few years immediately 
after the reforms.  This is certainly in contrast what was experienced in El Salvador 
during the similar length of time period.  
This initial effectiveness in reducing crime was not to last, however.  Recent data 
points to increases in crime and violence after the turn of the century.  Since 1999 
homicide rates in Guatemala have increased more than 120% to a rate of 47 per 100,000 
inhabitants, as reported in 2006.190  This is an increase from 37 per 100,000 inhabitants  
in 2002, when Guatemala was ranked the sixth most violent country in the world based 
on homicide rates.191  Therefore, any initial successes in terms of effectiveness appear to 
have been lost. 
5. Police Reform Impact on Organized Crime 
Whereas the security sector reform in El Salvador effectively purged the new 
police force of former militarized personnel, the same can certainly not be said about 
Guatemala’s reforms.  In a possible effort, according to Guatemala at least, to negate the 
possibility of creating a security vacuum as was seen in El Salvador, the new PNC 
consisted mainly of the same militarized personnel, many of whom were former members 
of the counterinsurgency groups that existed over the last decades of the civil conflict.  
According to WOLA, these clandestine counterinsurgency groups, with their years of 
experience and numerous illegal (and legal) contacts, adapted to, or even flourished in, 
the new security apparatus environment and had evolved into the hidden powers.192 
Essentially, by not demilitarizing the security sector, Guatemalan police reform 
maintained an environment in which former clandestine groups with ties to organized 
crime in the security sector today can operate unabated.  In 2007 WOLA asserted: 
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In reality, Guatemala remains as it was described in 2002 by Amnesty 
International, a “Corporate Mafia State” built on an alliance of traditional 
sectors of the oligarchy, new entrepreneurs, police and military officers, 
and common criminals.  The clandestine groups live off profits derived 
from state corruption, contraband, drug trafficking, kidnappings, car theft, 
money laundering and other forms of organized crime.193 
C. SUMMARY 
The main purpose of this chapter was to examine the differences between El 
Salvador with respect to security sector reform following the negotiated peace accords 
that took place in both countries.  Given the information provided herein, it is evident 
that, aside from the most general similarities between the two countries, El Salvador and 
Guatemala experienced quite different conditions that led each to the negotiating table, 
different approaches to security sector reform, and different outcomes with respect to 
impact that these reforms had immediately after their implementation.   
Whereas El Salvador experienced significant culminating events that prompted 
them to negotiate with the FMLN, Guatemala endured a drawn out and delayed path to 
peace caused by a different set of circumstances.  Police reform undertaken by El 
Salvador was a great deal more far reaching than that in Guatemala.  As a result, the 
years following the peace accords in El Salvador saw an increase in crime and violence, 
indicating an initial security vacuum due to a limited and ineffective police force.  
Guatemala, on the other hand, experienced a discernible reduction in violence and crime 
that seemed to prove an initial effectiveness of the newly formed PNC.  This was short 
lived, however, and today both Guatemala and El Salvador are ranked among the most 
violent nations in the world.  
How each country approached the issue of security sector reform had significant 
impact, both immediate and long term, on organized crime.  Because El Salvador adhered 
to the democratic tenets of the accords and demilitarized its security apparatus it essential 
removed a potentially dangerous element from a state institution and provided a far less 
agreeable environment for organized crime.  Guatemala, on the other hand, maintained a 
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militarized security sector consisting of many former counterinsurgency personnel with 
ties to organized crime.  These personnel adapted to the new security force structure and 
evolved into the clandestine organized criminal groups that threaten state security today.   
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IV. EFFECT OF POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS ON SECURITY 
SECTOR REFORM AND ORGANIZED CRIME 
As was seen in the previous chapter, security sector reform in El Salvador and 
Guatemala followed significantly different paths.  The cause for these differences can be 
found in the nature and relative strength of each country’s political parties.  In addition, 
the strength, or weakness, of party systems has had a direct impact on the ability of 
organized crime to infiltrate the state in El Salvador and Guatemala.  This chapter details 
these connections.  It begins by showing that the political party system in El Salvador is 
much stronger than the party system in place in Guatemala.   Second, it will show that the 
relative strength and weaknesses of these party systems had a direct impact on security 
sector reform both during the peace process as well as on the implementation of the 
reforms in the following years.  Finally, it will show that the strength, or weakness, of 
party systems has had a direct impact on the ability of organized crime to infiltrate the 
state. 
A. PARTY SYSTEM STRENGTH 
Before any discussion can be made of the relative effects of strong or weak 
political party systems on the security-sector reform in either country, it is important to 
understand what defines a strong or weak party system.  In other words, it must be 
determined how institutionalized a party system is.  Highly regarded scholars Scott 
Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully provide four criteria, which will be described below, 
for determining the degree to which a political party system is institutionalized.194  Omar 
Sánchez examined in detail, using Mainwaring and Scully’s four criteria, the level of 
institutionalization of the political party system in Guatemala.195  Rice University’s Mark 
P. Jones, in a detailed paper for the Inter-American Development Bank, examined 
eighteen Latin American countries utilizing opinion poll and empirical data to gauge each 
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country’s degree of institutionalization in the context of Mainwaring and Scully’s four 
criteria.196  Using these sources, the following will show that the party system in El 
Salvador is far more institutionalized than the party system in Guatemala. 
1. Criterion 1:  Party System Stability 
The first criterion for institutionalization, and most important to Mainwaring and 
Scully, is party system stability.  Mainwaring and Scully assert: 
Patterns of party competition must manifest some regularity, which is not 
to suggest that they become “frozen.”  A venue in which major parties 
regularly appear and then just as quickly evaporate is not characteristic of 
an institutionalized party system.  Where such stability does not exist, 
institutionalization is limited.197   
Here, one can look to electoral volatility, or the degree to which voting trends change 
across electoral cycles, as a measure of stability.  Omar Sánchez remarks that 
Guatemala’s electoral volatility is the highest of any Central American country and one 
of the highest in all of Latin America.  Sánchez writes: 
Guatemala’s average level of vote volatility is staggering, standing at 43.2 
percent for parliamentary elections during the 1985–2003 period and 53.4 
percent for presidential elections from 1985–1999.  To place these 
numbers in context, rates of electoral volatility in Western Europe hover 
around 5 to 10 percent in most countries, while the Latin American 
average stands at 21.5 percent.198 
Sánchez also points out as remarkable the “…fleeting relevance of large political 
groupings.  Indeed, it is difficult to find other examples of countries partaking in the 
global third wave of democratization in which the political parties that dominated the first 
postauthoritarian election became marginal only two elections later.”199   
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Coupled with the inability of major parties to win re-election is the great number 
of separate political parties vying for power during each election cycle.  Sánchez presents 
data on the top seven political parties for electoral cycles from 1985 to 2007.  During the 
four electoral cycles from 1995 to 2007, no less than twenty different political parties 
were presented.  Taking the top three parties from each cycle, this number is reduced to 
seven. The Frente Revelucionario Guatemalteco (FRG) and the Partido de Avanzada 
Nacional (PAN) emerge within the top two for the 1995 and 1999 elections, but  by the 
2007 election, the PAN failed to emerge within the top seven and the FRG was reduced 
to electoral insignificance.200    
In contrast to Guatemala’s unstable electoral landscape, El Salvador presents a far 
more institutionalized party system.  Since the signing of the peace accords in 1992, 
ARENA and FMLN have maintained their status as the two predominant political parties 
in the country, thereby making El Salvador a two-party system.  Electoral volatility in El 
Salvador, as of 2005, averaged approximately 10% and is more along the lines of 
Western European countries than countries in Latin America.201   
2. Criterion 2: Party Roots in Society 
The second criterion by which institutionalization can be gauged is the degree to 
which political parties have their roots in society.202  Mainwaring states that: 
The ties that bind parties and citizens are firmer; otherwise, parties do not 
structure political preferences over time and there is limited regularity in 
how people vote.  Strong party roots in society help provide the regularity 
that institutionalization implies.203 
One indicator in measuring the strength of a party’s roots in society is 
determining the extent to which the public identifies with a political party.204  A 2003 
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Latinbarómetro poll showed that Guatemala “…displayed one of the four lowest levels of 
party identification in Latin America.”205  In addition to low party identification among 
the populace, a lack of participation in the political process by the public in Guatemala is 
also significant indicator of the weak roots of Guatemala’s party system.   Sánchez 
writes: 
The 1999 referendum on constitutional reforms, which would have 
enshrined the most important elements of the 1996 Peace Accords in the 
constitution, had an extremely low participation rate of around 20 percent.  
In terms of other forms of political participation, such as following 
political news, partaking in public protests, and contacting parliamentary 
deputies, Guatemala has been ranked as the second-lowest country in the 
hemisphere.206 
Once again, in contrast to Guatemala, El Salvador displays a much higher degree 
of strength of party roots in society.  The 2003 Latinbarómetro poll showed that 45% of 
the populace identified themselves with a particular party in El Salvador, as opposed to 
only 34% in Guatemala.207  Additionally, setting itself far above Guatemala with respect 
to participation, El Salvador saw in the 2004 presidential election an unprecedented 67% 
voter turn out.208  Further, Jones utilized the Latinbarómetro poll along with other data in 
order to rank Latin American countries in terms of their political parties’ roots in society.  
El Savador was ranked near the top third of the eighteen countries examined where as 
Guatemala was ranked last.209   
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3. Criterion 3: Party Legitimacy 
The third criterion offered by Mainwaring and Scully is that “…major political 
actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to parties.”210  Jones, citing 
Mainwaring, explains: 
A basic prerequisite for an institutionalized party system is that both 
political parties as well as the elections in which they compete are viewed 
as legitimate by the population.  Furthermore, for an institutionalized party 
system to exist, political parties must be viewed as institutions that are 
vital to the proper functioning of the democratic system.211 
In terms of legitimacy, or rather the perception of legitimacy, Guatemala does not 
diverge as much from El Salvador as compared to the first two criteria offered by 
Mainwaring and Scully.  Prior to the 1996 peace agreements in Guatemala, as Sánchez 
notes, “the all-powerful counterinsurgency army made it impossible for left-wing 
political groups to participate, which constrained political freedom.”212  Since the 1995 
elections, however, and the following year’s peace accords, Guatemala has drastically 
improved its electoral processes.  Sánchez writes: 
While Guatemala remains very far from the ideal of a liberal democracy— 
characterized by constitutional government, the rule of law, and the 
protection of human rights—perhaps the country’s greatest achievement in 
recent years has been the consolidation of procedural, electoral 
democracy.  In the postconflict era, Guatemala has conducted elections 
that foreign observers and prominent international watchdog organizations 
have judges to be reasonably free and fair.213 
It is important to note, however, that the public image of free and fair elections is 
but one facet that constitutes legitimacy within a party system.  Sánchez and Jones both 
look to how indispensable to the political process, as viewed by the citizenry, the political 
party system is.  Sánchez notes, “Guatemalans view parties as corrupt, opportunistic, 
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demagogic, and unnecessary.”214 Jones, citing the 2003 Latinbarómetro poll, shows that 
only 26% of the Guatemalan populace viewed political parties as indispensable.215  
Moreover, Sánchez also points to how both the private business sector and the military 
accord legitimacy to political parties.  The private business sector in Guatemala has no 
real motivation to support a legitimate political system as a whole because doing so could 
“well weaken its preeminent position of power in society.”216 Similarly, the military, 
which has yet to be controlled by the civilian government, still remains well apart from 
politics as a separate autonomous entity and is, in effect, a “state within a state.” Sánchez 
asserts that the military has no motivation to accord legitimacy to the party system and 
states that “few Guatemalan generals have come to terms with the idea that in a 
democracy, elected governments, parties, and other democratic institutions are the 
ultimate power brokers.” 217   
Political parties in El Salvador do display higher degrees of legitimacy than do 
parties in Guatemala.  The Salvadoran parties do so, however, by a very slim margin.  
While 26% of Guatemalans view parties as indispensible, 33% of Salvadorans, according 
to Jones, have the same view.218  Jones provides a scale to provide the overall measure of 
legitimacy by combining poll data concerning both “party legitimacy” and “election 
legitimacy.”  This combined measure, what he calls “Party and Election (P&E) 
Legitimacy” reveals the percentage of society that considers both parties and elections as 
legitimate.  According to Jones, 34% of Salvadorans view both parties and elections as 
legitimate, while 33% of Guatemalans hold the same view.219  Overall, the party system 
in El Salvador appears to hold more legitimacy than the party system in Guatemala, but 
certainly not by very much.   
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4. Criterion 4: Party Organization 
The final criterion by which Mainwaring and Scully assess party system 
institutionalization is how parties are organized.  The authors write: 
They [parties]  are not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders; 
they acquire an independent status and value of their own.  The party 
becomes autonomous vis-à-vis movements or organizations that initially 
may have created it for instrumental purposes.  It is a sign of greater 
institutionalization if party structures are firmly established, if they are 
territorially comprehensive, if parties are well organized, and if they have 
resources of their own.220 
Sánchez asserts that party organization is the most critical factor in determining party 
system institutionalization and he unequivocally states that, “Guatemalan parties are 
unambiguously subordinated to the interests of their founders or leaders.”221  In 
Guatemala, more often than not, as goes the party leader, so goes the party.  In other 
words, parties are not separate entities that can either exert influence on the leader or 
continue on after the leader has left the political stage.  Sánchez writes that, “most parties 
are so firmly in the grip of their creators that they can scarcely be conceived as viable 
organizations without them.  The empirical record shows that in virtually all cases, the 
doom of the party leaders seals the fate of the party itself.”222  Sánchez also cites the 
shifting allegiances of elected leaders, little public financial support for parties, lax 
regulations governing private contributions to parties, the infiltration of organized crime, 
and a lack of ideological commitment by both leaders and constituents alike as all 
contributing to poor party system institutionalization.223   
Jones examines political party organization by analyzing two variables: the age of 
the political party and perception by elites that the party is a continuous entity.  By 
combining historical data with data from opinion polls he constructs a scored ranking 
scale by which party organization is measured across the eighteen Latin American 
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countries.  In this scale, El Salvador shows a much higher degree of party organization by 
ranking seventh among the eighteen countries with a score of 78.25 out of 100.  
Guatemala, on the other hand, is ranked last, with a score of 57.5 out of 100.224   
5. Summary 
Both the commentary and analysis by Sánchez and the data provided by Jones 
clearly indicate that across all four criteria offered by Mainwaring and Scully, El 
Salvador possesses a political party system that is far more institutionalized than the 
system within Guatemala.  With the exception of party legitimacy, El Salvador and 
Guatemala are well apart from each other in the degree to which the party systems 
function as an institution, with Guatemala almost always at the bottom of any scale of 
measurement.  The rest of this chapter details how  a strong party system in El Salvador 
and weak party system in Guatemala have affected the extent to which organized crime 
has infiltrated the security sector and the political system.  
B. PARTY IMPACT ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
The differences inherent in the political party system in both El Salvador and 
Guatemala had a definitive impact on how security sector reform was undertaken during 
the peace negotiations in 1992 and 1996 respectively.  The strong party system in El 
Salvador created an environment in which thorough and democratic negotiations 
concerning security sector reform could take place between ARENA and FMLN.  In 
Because ARENA had broken its ties with the military (as will be discussed) and because 
FMLN, now a legitimized and sizable political party with notable strength at the 
negotiating table, neither side had the incentive, nor wherewithal, to effectively take full 
advantage of the other.  Conversely, a loose and weakly institutionalized party system in 
Guatemala created an environment in which negotiations and the subsequent accords 
were so complex and vague as to provide the government with first, a scapegoat in the 
face of threatening opposition from traditional power structures (the military and private 
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sector elites) and second, a process of reform that could be manipulated or stalled, 
because of its sheer complexity, so as to avoid any unwanted concessions.  
1. Political Party Impact on Police Reform in El Salvador 
When the governing party ARENA entered into the peace talks with FMLN that 
culminated with the end of the conflict, it legitimized FMLN as a political party; a party 
that was now guaranteed full political rights under the law.225 ARENA and FMLN 
negotiated what was to be the most important aspect of the peace accords; the 
transformation of the security apparatus from a militarized institution to a largely 
transparent and civilian-oriented institution.226    
Throughout the conflict, FMLN had enjoyed substantial popular support.  Though 
downplayed by the Salvadoran government, as well as the United States during the civil 
war, FMLN had garnered much support from a good portion of the populace.  Once 
FMLN was legitimized as a political party, this popular support translated into strength at 
the negotiating table as well as strength at the ballot box in elections following the peace 
accords.227  This strength enabled FMLN to act as more or less an equal to ARENA 
during the negotiations.  Further, continued electoral support in the following years 
allowed FMLN to function as a cohesive and viable political party in the congress and 
enabled the party to monitor the implementation of the peace accords.    
As for ARENA, internal transformation of the party prior to the peace accords 
created incentives for extensive security sector reform.  According to Christine Wade: 
Following ARENA’s legislative victory in 1988, Alfredo Cristiani, a 
wealthy businessman and landowner, became head of the party.  Cristiani 
was more moderate and more pragmatic than party founder Roberto 
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administration embraced the neoliberal model, and believed that ending 
the war was necessary to guarantee foreign aid and the return of foreign 
capital.228 
As noted in Chapter III, following the murder of six Jesuit scholars and two others 
by Salvadoran troops in November of 1989 (as a response to the FMLN offensive), 
public outcry at home and abroad resulted in the suspension of U.S. aid to the Salvadoran 
armed forces.  ARENA, as well as many in the FMLN, now saw that a negotiated peace 
settlement was a far better option than a continued military stalemate and Cristiani 
personally solicited mediation from the United Nations.229  ARENA had now developed 
a new free market ideology and strong ties to the business class, thereby breaking from its 
original right-wing roots in the military and death squads.  Further, as Stanley and Loosle 
note, the political influence enjoyed by the Salvadoran military in the years prior to the 
1989 FMLN offensive was now greatly diminished.  As a result, the military was “no 
longer in a position to veto any civilian-led peace initiatives.…”230 The party made 
concessions on military and police reform to FMLN, both as a way to consolidate the 
transformation of the party and as a way to avoid making any concessions on 
socioeconomic issues.  Stanley notes that “remarkably absent from the accords were the 
socioeconomic issues that had helped spark the conflict and that motivated many 
supporters of the FMLN.231  Land and other economic benefits were awarded to many 
former combatants from both the FMLN and the Salvadoran military but socioeconomic 
issues were relegated to a special forum, consisting of representatives from the 
government, business, and labor interests, in which very little progress was likely to be 
achieved.  Stanley further notes: 
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This wasn’t just a sell-out by the FMLN: its leaders recognized that they 
had limited leverage.  They also recognized that ARENA was willing to 
sacrifice much of the power of the armed forces but would be much less 
willing to negotiate major economic concessions.232 
ARENA and FMLN, while not the only parties in El Salvador since the accords, 
are certainly the two most powerful, thereby the only real players in a two-party system.  
Both parties had negotiated and signed the accords, which in turn, provided strong 
incentives to implement and enforce the agreements they reached.  For example, in mid-
1995 the ARENA-led government and the PNC had shown definite signs of taking 
seriously the threat of organized criminal entities by increasing pressure on known 
suspected organizations, indicating that ARENA supported implementation of the 
reforms.233 
The situation in El Salvador, in which a highly institutionalized party system 
created an environment that was conducive to democratic peace negotiations and 
successful implementation of security sector reforms in the following years, is in stark 
contrast to the conditions in Guatemala.  There a weakly institutionalized party system 
had immediate as well as long lasting effects on security sector reform.   
2. Political Party Impact on Police Reform in Guatemala 
In Guatemala, unlike in El Salvador, the political conditions present during the 
prolonged peace negotiations were not conducive to expedient and democratic security 
sector reform.  The main problem lie in the strength, or rather lack thereof, of both sides.  
The National Advancement Party (PAN) government had obtained power by a very small 
margin and “continued to confront the traditional weaknesses of civilian governments: a 
powerful military, a conservative business elite, a fragmented and unstable political party 
system, and one of the weakest fiscal bases in the hemisphere.”234  The URNG, having 
been essentially defeated militarily almost a decade prior, posed no real threat to the 
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government, and therefore brought no real strength to the negotiations in order to demand 
concessions.235  As noted in the previous section on party institutionalization, neither the 
military nor the private business sector had any real motivation for supporting political 
parties, which in turn translated into little support for any reforms throughout the peace 
negotiations.  A 1997 North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) report 
highlighted this point at the time the accords were being implemented.  NACLA states: 
The second-largest party in Congress [FRG] is the extreme-right party of 
ex-dictator Efrain Rios Montt, which has stated that it feels no obligation 
to cooperate. Both in the army and in the private sector, there will be 
hundreds of ways to sabotage the Accords or to secure only partial 
compliance—which, on some points, would be as bad as non-compliance. 
An early example of just how difficult the struggles will be is the February 
1997 Congressional law creating the new civilian police.236 
In contrast to the expedient peace process in El Salvador, as described in Chapter 
III, negotiations for a democratic peace in Guatemala had been taking place since the late 
1980s and experienced a long and drawn out, largely unfruitful process.  While a 
complete examination of the initial peace negotiations is far beyond the scope of this 
chapter, some mention must be made as to the impetus for the government to move the 
process along to a conclusion.  In late 1993, three years before the peace accords were 
signed, the UN began mediating initial peace talks and by late 1994 it established a 
human rights observer mission (MINUGUA) in the country to monitor progress.  At this 
time many in the government began to understand that a consolidated peace agreement 
was in their best interest because it could counteract the horrendous human rights record 
and open the door to renewed foreign investment.  By 1995, realizing the benefits of 
reaching a consolidated peace, the new administration of Alvaro Arzú, and the slim 
majority of the PAN party in Congress, sought to complete the peace process with 
international mediation.  Their efforts, however, did not proceed with the intensity and 
commitment to democratic change as was seen with ARENA in El Salvador.  Stanley and 
                                                 
235 Stanley and Holiday, “Broad Participation.” 
236 North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), “The Guatemalan Peace Accords,” 
October 17, 1997. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/140.html (accessed May 25, 2009). 
 67
Holiday explain that the peace process had offered Arzú a strategy that could overcome 
the resistance from the military and the conservative private sector elites.  They write: 
The accords promised the government a framework to rally support for 
modernization, while retaining the option of blaming unpopular measures 
on international pressure and the demands of economic globalization.  At 
the same time, the implementation processes agreed to were so complex 
and involved so many different actors that the government could easily 
allow individual reforms to languish if opposition proved too strong.237 
In other words, for Arzú and PAN, a mediated peace process would improve the 
government’s reputation both domestically and on the global stage, thereby garnering 
domestic support as well as opening avenues for increased foreign investment.  Because 
of his party’s weak political position, however, Arzú needed a scapegoat to deflect 
opposition to any unpopular concessions to URNG.  Therefore, if pressure from the 
military and economic elites became too threatening, Arzú and PAN could then turn the 
blame on international pressure.  Finally, the accords were made so vague so as to 
provide an “out” in the form of convoluted implementation of complex reforms.  It was in 
this cautious and half-hearted spirit then, with little pressure from the weak URNG, that 
Guatemala approached the peace accords and undertook security sector reform.   
Whereas the government in El Salvador implemented reform in concert with the 
democratic principles set out in the peace accords (a newly structured, civilian trained, 
and de-militarized police force), reform implementation in Guatemala fell far short. 
Unlike in El Salvador, the U.N. observer mission MINUGUA did not field a CIVPOL 
component to monitor the new PNC.  The U.N. was unable to take the same proactive 
role that it did in El Salvador in large part because of the government’s cautious and half-
hearted approach borne of a weak political party.  Stanley writes: 
In Guatemala, the vagueness of the accords, the weakness of the 
incumbent government, and the existence of a domestic right-wing 
opposition presumed to be opposed to many of the accords, all conspired 
to weaken the ability of the UN to challenge the government's approach to 
police development.238 
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Not only did the weakness of the government party undermine reform negotiation 
and implementation in Guatemala, but so too did the weakness of the political party 
associated with the guerrillas.  In El Salvador, FMLN, because of its inherent strength as 
a party, was able to ensure that, for the most part, any security sector reform that was 
agreed upon was implemented and sustained in the years following the peace accords.  In 
Guatemala however, the weak URNG, coupled with a weak political party system, meant 
that any negotiated reforms were constantly in danger of being altered or not 
implemented at all.  Bernardo Arévalo de León, in an examination of civil-military 
relations and military reform implementation in Guatemala following the peace accords, 
notes that between 1997 and 2000, new senior military officers appointed by Arzú and 
with good political ties to his administration, adopted a level of resistance to reform 
implementation.  One such example is that while the accords called for the 
demilitarization of the security sector and utilizing the military for external defense only, 
military officials merely renamed several military units that were once assigned to 
counterinsurgency operations in an attempt to deceive MINUGUA.  Additionally, 
surveillance of political opponents to Arzú’s administration had continued to be 
conducted by the military.239   
In the 1999 elections, the Arzú administration and PAN was defeated by president 
Alfonso Portillo and the FRG.  While Arzú was able to somewhat subjugate the military 
to civilian control, at least on the surface, by installing new senior officers of his 
choosing as well as reducing the military budget, Portillo faced opposition to reform 
implementation by those sympathetic to the military.  J. Mark Ruhl, in an examination of 
reform implementation by both the Atzú and Portillo administrations, writes: 
However, ex-military officers unfriendly to reform, such as Ríos Montt, 
now president of Congress, and presidential advisor and retired general 
Francisco Ortega Menaldo, gained great influence in the new 
administration.  The FRG-dominated Congress also showed little interest 
in building on the changes to the armed forces that Arzú had made.  The 
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military reform process soon began to regress, as military missions 
multiplied and the armed forces budget decline was reversed.240 
As de León notes, the election of Oscar Berger as president in 2004 saw little 
implementation of security sector reform as well.  In fact, the opposite seems to have 
occurred.  While the initial peace accords in 1996 called for the demilitarization of the 
security sector, under Berger, it actually increased. De León writes: 
The trend for continued involvement in internal security issues has been 
reaffirmed by President Berger’s Administration.  Upon the legal basis 
provided by Decree 40-2000, intelligence and operative collaboration 
between National Civilian Police and the Armed Forces has been 
strengthened…And a rising level of social protest over socio-economic 
issues has been met with the mobilization of military forces in support of 
police operations, in confrontation—once again—with social 
organizations.241 
The commentary and analysis cited here by de León and Ruhl have mainly 
focused on resistance from the military to any reform.  Former members of the military 
were key players in the party system or government advisers, as weak parties were unable 
to develop their own ideas or personnel to run the country. De León identifies four 
reasons for the failure of security sector reform, three of which concern weaknesses of 
the political system: 
1. The weakness of the civilian political leadership in terms of its capacity to 
negotiate the design and implementation of the necessary reforms with the 
armed forces.  
2. Resistance to transformation from the armed forces as a result of 
misinformation, mistrust and ideology.  
3. The marginalization of the issue on the public agenda because of a lack of 
understanding and interest from political parties, government officials and 
the media.  
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4. The weakness of concerned civil society groups in terms of their capacity 
to influence the agenda on security reform and negotiate substantive 
proposals with government and political parties.242   
De León’s last point concerning the weakness of “concerned civil society groups” can be 
expounded on in an example provided by Ruhl.  The May 1999 national referendum 
concerning two amendments to the constitution as called for by the accords was defeated.  
One amendment would have placed a civilian at the head of the defense ministry and the 
other legally absolved the military of any responsibility for internal security, except in 
special cases.  Despite the importance of these reforms, political parties showed little 
interest or ability in mobilizing the public to vote.  Ruhl notes a significant lack of public 
interest in the referendum as “less than 19% of those registered voted in the referendum, 
and its failure constituted a major setback for military reform.243   
3. Summary 
The relative strength or weakness of political party systems in El Salvador and 
Guatemala had a direct impact on how security sector reform was negotiated and 
implemented in each country.  A strong party system consisting of ARENA and FMLN 
in El Salvador ensured that reform was negotiated along democratic principles and 
ensured that these negotiated reforms were implemented and maintained in the following 
years.  In contrast, the weakness of both the political party system in Guatemala and the 
URNG, coupled with an inability to oppose resistance from a strong conservative and 
regressive right, as well as an almost indifferent public, are most responsible for the 
initial shape and following scope of security sector reform in Guatemala, both of which 
fell far short of democratic intentions of the peace accords.  How security sector reform 
was undertaken had direct impact on the future state of organized crime.  Comprehensive 
reform, as was seen in El Salvador, was highly critical to breaking the links between the 
security sector and organized criminal elements.  In contrast, limited reform in Guatemala 
ensured that those links remained. 
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C. PARTY IMPACT ON INFILTRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME  
The relative strength of the political party systems is not only important in 
shaping the nature of security sector reform (and hence the links between that sector and 
organized crime), but it also influences the ability of organized crime to penetrate the 
state.  The following sections describe how a strong party system in El Salvador has 
limited the penetration of organized crime elements within the political system and the 
government and, conversely, how the weak party system in Guatemala allowed for a 
much more prolific infiltration of organized crime elements.  
1. Political Parties and Organized Crime in El Salvador 
The strong two-party system serves to limit the penetration of organized crime in 
El Salvador in two ways.  First, the institutionalized parties act as gatekeepers in keeping 
nefarious elements out of the system.  Highly institutionalized parties with roots in 
society and strong party organizations have access to and maintain their own resources 
borne of a strong support base.  The old adage “nature abhors a vacuum” applies as well 
to politics.  Where parties are weak and fluid organizations without clear programs, 
personnel to fill candidacies, apparatuses for getting out the vote, and consistent sources 
of funding, organized crime elements can easily fill the void. While institutionalized 
parties do not inoculate the political system from organized crime penetration—
individual politicians will always have incentives to seek money from all sources—it 
keeps this from reaching systemic proportions (and even provides a check against 
individual violations, as party members without ties to organized crime will “raise the 
alarm”).   Nor does the existence of institutionalized parties guard against other possible 
forms of corruption unrelated to organized crime: ARENA has benefited business 
contributions in return for favorable government contracts and concessions.  A recent  
editorial noted  that “it is well known that ARENA has a donors list organized according 
by amount contributed. Those who give more are owed the juiciest rewards.”244  
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The second way in which the party system in El Salvador keeps organized crime 
at bay lies in the elected president’s support base.  A president with a strong support base 
is better able to establish policy and execute legislation than a president with minority 
support in congress.  Advisers come from within the president’s own party and the 
president has organized support for pushing forward the party agenda, in security sector 
reform or any other issues area.  This can be seen in the mid-1990s, following 
recommendations by the Joint Group.  El Salvador saw the creation of a special “police 
unit to investigate political crimes and passage of new laws to facilitate prosecution of 
cases related to political violence and organized crime.”245  In March of 1996, the 
government passed the Emergency Law Against Organized Crime.  Though controversial 
because provisions would increase prison terms for serious crimes and effectively 
overcrowding the prison system at the time, it was an example of legislation passed in an 
effort combat organized crime.246 
Both ARENA and FMLN are strongly institutionalized and ARENA, in the 
distant and recent past, has shown solid support for their presidents.  In March of this 
year, FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes won the presidential election, marking the first 
time FMLN has won the presidency.247  While it is far too soon to determine how well 
the party will support Funes, there are currently no indications that suggest that party 
support will be a problem.   
Like the previous examination on party strength in El Salvador (and lack thereof 
in Guatemala), it is probably more convincing to examine the case of Guatemala and 
compare it to El Salvador in order to show that how first, strong parties act as gatekeepers 
to the political system and second, how strong party support for presidents both keep 
organized crime from infiltrating the state.  In other words, by showing that the weak 
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party system in Guatemala has allowed organized crime penetration of the state, it can be 
better understood how the strong party system in El Salvador has kept organized crime 
out. 
2. Political Parties and Organized Crime in Guatemala 
According to the 2007 WOLA report The Captive State, “much of the rising 
violence has been attributed to illegal armed groups or clandestine security organizations 
that emerged during the war years and today use bribery, intimidation, and violence to 
protect their political and financial interests.”248  Additionally, WOLA asserts that “they 
[organized crime elements] develop or buy political influence, and they infiltrate the state 
apparatus to build a shield of impunity.”249  From these two statements alone it can be 
understood that organized crime, with its hallmarks of corruption and violence, have 
penetrated the Guatemalan state through the political system.  The answer as to why this 
is able to occur lies in the fact that Guatemala, unlike El Salvador, has a weakly 
institutionalized party system.   
Guatemala’s weak party system is desperately inadequate to act as a gatekeeper to 
keep organized crime out of the political realm.  The reason for this is found in the same 
reason that El Salvador’s parties are able to prevent organized crime infiltration.  Because 
the numerous parties in Guatemala lack the strong financial support from a legitimate 
support base they suffer, in effect, from a financial vacuum.  Realizing the tremendous 
opportunity to capitalize on this vacuum, organized crime entities are able to use vast 
amounts of funds from illegal activities to purchase political influence and power.  
WOLA’s 2003 Hidden Powers best describes the infiltration of criminal elements into the 
state.  Authors Peacock and Beltrán state: 
In addition to reaping huge profits, the hidden powers in Guatemala use 
their connections, with political actors and with the military and police, to 
intimidate, or even eliminate, those that get in their way, know too much, 
offer competition, or try to investigate their activities.250 
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The authors cite a Hemisphere Initiatives report in which they state that “the relative 
weakness of political parties in Guatemala” is a major cause for organized crime 
penetration.251  Had a financial vacuum caused by a weak support base not been present 
within the party system, organized crime entities would not have had the opportunity, or 
at least not as open an opportunity, to utilize bribery to gain access to the political sphere.  
This is not to say that organized crime would not use other means, such as violence and 
intimidation (which they currently employ) to gain access to politicians, but if the parties 
were more consolidated and enjoyed a stronger base to provide financial resources, at 
least one major opening to the state would have been closed to organized crime elements.   
Presidents in Guatemala have found the influence of organized crime to be severe.  
Peacock and Beltrán describe the conditions facing newly elected President Portillo in 
2001.  The authors write: 
Flanked by his Minister of Defense and U.S. Ambassador Prudence 
Bushnell, Portillo told a mixed audience of civilians and military officers 
that, during his short tenure, he had found that the power of the state does 
not rest in the presidency, but rather is unlawfully held by the hidden 
powers.252 
Peacock and Beltrán reinforce Portillo’s sentiments by calling into question Portillo’s 
actual role as president, providing evidence, albeit anecdotal, that the real power lay in 
his appointed presidential advisors, who had close ties with organized crime.253 
Perhaps the most recent, albeit speculative, indication of the infiltration of 
organized crime into the national political sphere is found in the murder of Guatemalan 
attorney Rodrigo Rosenberg on May 10, 2009.  Rosenberg, in a highly publicized video 
that was recorded prior to his death, stated that “if you are hearing or seeing this message 
it is because I was assassinated by President Álvaro Colom, with the help of Mr. Gustavo 
Alejos and Mr. Gregorio Valdez.”254  While the investigation into Rosenberg’s murder is 
                                                 
251 Peacock and Beltrán, “Hidden Powers,” 36. 
252 Ibid., 51. 
253 Ibid., 36–41. 
254 José De Cordoba, “Dead Lawyer's Video Pitches Guatemala Into Crisis,” May 13, 2009. Wall 
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not complete and no suspects have been identified as of this date, Rosenberg alleges in 
the tape that he was targeted “because he planned to go public with evidence that the 
Colom administration used Guatemala's rural development bank, Banrural, to launder 
drug money and funnel public funds to drug cartels through shell organizations linked to 
the first lady, who oversees scores of social programs.”255 According to Guatemalan 
expert professor Anita Isaacs, as reported in the Wall Street Journal, “this speaks to the 
incredible violence that takes place every day in Guatemala from organized criminal 
networks that have infiltrated the state."256 Regardless of the future outcome, 
Rosenberg’s murder and recent developments have cast grave assertions concerning both 
President Colom’s strength as a president and his ties to organized crime.257  
In sum, there is no shortage of commentary and evidence displaying how the 
weak political party system in Guatemala creates an environment that can be readily 
exploited by organized crime.  
3. Summary 
El Salvador’s highly institutionalized party system creates an environment that 
has prevented, or at least severely limited, wholesale infiltration of organized crime into 
the state.  While organized crime does exist in El Salvador, and some government 
corruption is evident, organized crime does not penetrate the state in a systemic way.  
Strong party organization, one of Mainwaring and Scully’s four criteria for 
institutionalization, ensured ARENA and FMLN had the financial and personnel 
resources necessary to function as gatekeepers to the political sphere.  Additionally, 
strong party organization afforded presidents in El Salvador the support they required to 
enact policy without influence from organized crime—and, indeed, to implement policies 
targeting and breaking preexisting ties between organized crime and the state. 
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In Guatemala, however, the opposite is true.  Weak party organization allowed a 
vacuum to exist that organized crime elements exploit for financial gain and political 
influence.  Further, the weakness of Guatemalan presidents from the time of the accords 
to the present day allowed for the extreme penetration of organized crime.  Unable to rely 
on a strong party base for support, presidents in Guatemala have been unable to take on 
organized crime.  In the worst cases, the lack of a strong base of support has made them 
highly susceptible to organized crime’s influence.   
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Contrary to popular perception, the evolution of crime and violence since the 
signing of the peace accords in El Salvador and Guatemala has taken divergent paths.  
The causes for each type of criminal threat, gangs, drug trafficking, and organized crime 
vary between each nation and both the levels and effects of each criminal pattern is 
significantly different.   
Gangs and gang activity are prevalent in both nations, but pose a greater threat in 
El Salvador than Guatemala.  U.S. immigration policy changes in the 1990s likely 
contributed to the emergence of a newer and more violent form of gangs when thousands 
of illegal immigrants, many with criminal records, were deported back to El Salvador 
after that country’s transition to democracy.  Gangs such as MS–13 and Barrio 18, while 
in existence in both countries, are far more active and consolidated in El Salvador than in 
Guatemala.  Crime data, in the form of homicide rates, does lend credence to assertion 
that gangs and gang violence have a definite impact on the security of the populace, but 
since crime data available on El Salvador contains inconsistencies, it is difficult to 
ascertain the true level of the effects of gang violence in that country. Given the 
sometimes contradictory and inaccurate data available, it appears evident that much more 
investigation is required if an accurate assessment of the violence and crime with respect 
to gangs is to be made.   Once again, this further investigation is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  While gangs are involved in local drug dealing, there is little indication they are 
involved in transnational drug trafficking nor is there support for claims that they have 
evolved into sophisticated  “third generation” transnational criminal enterprises.  Gangs 
such as MS–13 are increasingly labeled as organized criminals, but this definition lacks 
all of the hallmarks of such activity, specifically corruption, penetration of the licit 
economy in the form of money laundering, and high degrees of sophistication.   
The transportation of illegal narcotics from the Andean Ridge to the world’s 
largest customer base, the United States, takes place through both El Salvador and 
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Guatemala, and as such, is of great concern to policymakers in the United States.  Drug 
seizure data collated by several U.S. and international organizations shows that by far, 
more drug trafficking takes place in Guatemala than in El Salvador.  Geographical 
advantages provided by the boundaries of Guatemala appear to make that country a more 
desirable locale with which to conduct illicit activity.  The effects of DTO activity are 
more readily seen in Guatemala.  Analysis presented in Chapter II shows that there is a 
strong correlation between high homicide rates and trafficking activity based on the 
locations in which DTO activity is known to take place.  As for El Salvador, an 
incomplete set of reliable crime trend data does not allow for a true assessment of DTO’s 
impact on the country.  Regardless of the exact measurement of its effect in each country, 
DTO activity does pose a serious threat to both country’s domestic security, as well as a 
threat to U.S. national security in the form of harmful illegal narcotics entering the 
country. 
The focal point of interest to this thesis is organized crime and its penetration of 
the state.  There is no denying that organized crime is present in El Salvador, in the form 
of a litany of criminal activities from connections to drug trafficking, car theft, 
kidnapping, and other illegal ventures.  In the previous chapters, however, it has been 
shown that organized crime, with its hallmarks of high levels of corruption and violence, 
is far more prevalent in Guatemala.  Organized crime in El Salvador has not in the past, 
nor in the present, developed into a threat that has pervaded the state and affected its 
institutions.  This is not the case in Guatemala.  The hidden powers at work in Guatemala 
display all of the hallmarks of organized crime; high levels of corruption and violence, 
penetration of the licit economy, and a high degree of sophistication. 
A key purpose of this thesis was to determine the reasons for the different levels 
of organized crime in the two countries.  Chapters III and IV provided evidence that both 
security sector reform and the past and current state of political party systems have had a 
major impact on the ability of organized crime to take hold..  In El Salvador, a highly 
institutionalized party system created an environment in which peace negotiations and 
subsequent security sector reforms were conducted in a democratic fashion that kept 
within the true intent of the peace agreements.  ARENA’s institutionalized support base 
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within the business sector led it to agree to security sector reform in exchange for making 
no concessions to the FMLN on socioeconomic issues.   Additionally, FMLN was strong 
enough as a party to ensure that police reforms continued to be implemented and 
maintained in the years following the peace agreement.  The strength of these parties, as 
was shown, effectively filled the role of gatekeeper to keep organized criminal elements 
from penetrating the state.   
In Guatemala, conversely, clandestine groups and interests, unafraid to use 
bribery, intimidation, and violence have permeated the highest levels of government.  
These hidden powers have become so ensconced within state institutions that the 
continuance of democracy is threatened.  With origins in the militarized security sector in 
place during the many years of civil war, organized crime has developed and adapted to 
the security sector reforms that Guatemala undertook as part of the peace agreements.  In 
contrast to El Salvador, the security apparatus in Guatemala was not demilitarized.  In 
fact, over the years a trend of increasing involvement in domestic security by military 
forces has been seen.  The weakness of the numerous political parties in Guatemala has 
inhibited  security sector reform and permitted criminal elements to infiltrate politics.  
The weakness of URNG meant that limited police reform could be implemented with 
little or no effective opposition.  While the continued presence of militarized factions in 
the security sector did effectively deal with a potential security vacuum following the end 
of hostilities, it set the stage for elements with illicit motives to adapt to the changing 
security environment and continue with criminal activity.  Further, the weak party system 
could not, and to this day is unable to, act as a gatekeeper of the political sphere.  
Corruption tied to the hidden powers is nearly all–pervasive in Guatemala, and with this 
corruption comes high levels of violence, as is evident by the recent murder of Rodrigo 
Rosenberg.   
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Of vital interest to the United States is the promotion and sustainment of 
democracy in regions throughout the world.  While gangs do pose a serious threat to 
domestic security in countries throughout Central America, they are not the most critical 
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criminal threat, contrary to what is often reported in the media and by many 
policymakers.  Similarly, drug trafficking activity, which poses a threat to domestic 
security in the United States and contributes to crime and violence in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, is not the preeminent threat in the region.  It is the existence of sophisticated 
organized criminal entities with the hallmarks of public violence and corruption within 
state institutions that threatens democracy the most.  Corruption at all levels, from local 
police forces to high ranking government officials and business leaders, erodes the rule of 
law and severely affects the confidence of the citizenry in the state to function as a 
democratic institution.  This erosion of the rule of law leads to the further expansion of 
criminal enterprises and shadow economies at all levels of society in which the populace 
partake either for personal enrichment, or in many cases, survival.  With the expansion of 
crime inevitably comes an increase in violence, further eroding both public security and 
the rule of law thereby starting the cycle once again. 
To date, much emphasis by scholars, the media, and policymakers has been on the 
problem of gangs or drug trafficking while neglecting the larger problem of organized 
crime.   As such, further investigation into the specific activities of criminal syndicates 
operating within the state is required.  It has been asserted in this thesis that Guatemala 
suffers far more from organized crime than does El Salvador.  It has not been asserted, 
however, that organized crime in El Salvador is nonexistence, and therefore concerted 
further research should be conducted on organized crime in both countries to better equip 
analysts and policymakers with the background information required to make sound 
decisions. 
Any foreign policy implementation by the United States with respect to El 
Salvador and Guatemala should take into serious account the political party systems in 
both countries.  The examination presented herein clearly indicates that the strength of 
party systems has a definitive impact on the ability of organized crime to operate and 
expand, and important lessons can be learned by the comparison of party systems in El 
Salvador and Guatemala. Policy designed to strengthen the party system in Guatemala 
could provide dividends in the future in the form of effective political resistance to the 
infiltration of the organized crime.  Pressure from strong party leaders to prosecute and 
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dismantle the criminal networks in place may also put secondary pressure on the drug 
trafficking organizations with whom the hidden powers collaborate.  Policy designed to 
maintain the current strength of the two-party system in El Salvador would pay similar 
dividends in that organized crime penetration of the state would remain limited in the 
near term, and possibly reduced in the future. 
How to specifically design new policy regarding crime and violence in El 
Salvador and Guatemala is far beyond the scope of this thesis.  What is recommended, 
however, is that a greater focus should be made in order to better understand the nature, 
levels, and effects of organized crime and their interaction within the state, rather than 
continuing policy that is only geared towards responding to the threats of gangs and drug 
trafficking organizations.  
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